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Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Against Arbitrary Bounded-size Leakage Family

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Theory of Cryptography (TCC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13747))

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Abstract

Motivated by leakage-resilient secure computation of circuits with addition and multiplication gates, this work studies the leakage-resilience of linear secret-sharing schemes with a small reconstruction threshold against any bounded-size family of joint leakage attacks, i.e., the leakage function can leak global information from all secret shares.

We first prove that, with high probability, the Massey secret-sharing scheme corresponding to a random linear code over a finite field F is leakage-resilient against any \(\ell \)-bit joint leakage family of size at most \(|{F}|^{k-2.01}/8^\ell \), where k is the reconstruction threshold. Our result (1) bypasses the bottleneck due to the existing Fourier-analytic approach, (2) enables secure multiplication of secrets, and (3) is near-optimal. We use combinatorial and second-moment techniques to prove the result.

Next, we show that the Shamir secret-sharing scheme over a prime-order field F with randomly chosen evaluation places and with threshold k is leakage-resilient to any \(\ell \)-bit joint leakage family of size at most \(|{F}|^{2k-n-2.01}/(k!\cdot 8^\ell )\) with high probability. We prove this result by marrying our proof techniques for the first result with the existing Fourier analytical approach. Moreover, it is unlikely that one can extend this result beyond \(k/n\leqslant 0.5\) due to the technical hurdle for the Fourier-analytic approach.

Hemanta K. Maji, Hai H. Nguyen, Mingyuan Wang, Xiuyu Ye, and Albert Yu are supported in part by an NSF CRII Award CNS–1566499, NSF SMALL Awards CNS–1618822 and CNS–2055605, the IARPA HECTOR project, MITRE Innovation Program Academic Cybersecurity Research Awards (2019–2020, 2020–2021), a Ross-Lynn Research Scholars Grant (2021–2022), a Purdue Research Foundation (PRF) Award (2017–2018), and The Center for Science of Information, an NSF Science and Technology Center, Cooperative Agreement CCF–0939370. Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky and Tom Suad are supported by the Ariel Cyber Innovation Center in conjunction with the Israel National Cyber directorate in the Prime Minister’s Office. Mingyuan Wang is also supported in part by DARPA under Agreement No. HR00112020026, AFOSR Award FA9550-19-1-0200, NSF CNS Award 1936826, and research grants by the Sloan Foundation, and Visa Inc. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Government or DARPA.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This random linear code only needs to be chosen once. With only an exponentially small failure probability, the Massey secret-sharing scheme corresponding to this code shall be leakage-resilient. For instance, this random linear code can be specified by, for example, a common random string (CRS).

  2. 2.

    This observation is due to that a random square matrix over a large enough field F is full-rank with overwhelming probability.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, USA

    Hemanta K. Maji, Hai H. Nguyen, Xiuyu Ye & Albert Yu

  2. Department of Computer Science, Ariel University, Ariel, Israel

    Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky & Tom Suad

  3. Department of EECS, University of California Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

    Mingyuan Wang

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  1. Hemanta K. Maji
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Correspondence to Hai H. Nguyen .

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  1. Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Eike Kiltz

  2. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Vinod Vaikuntanathan

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Maji, H.K. et al. (2022). Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Against Arbitrary Bounded-size Leakage Family. In: Kiltz, E., Vaikuntanathan, V. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13747. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22318-1_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22318-1_13

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