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Distinguishing Error of Nonlinear Invariant Attacks

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Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2022 (INDOCRYPT 2022)

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Abstract

Todo et al. (2018) have proposed nonlinear invariant attacks which consider correlations between nonlinear input and output combiners for a key alternating block cipher. In its basic form, a nonlinear invariant attack is a distinguishing attack. In this paper we obtain precise expressions for the errors of nonlinear invariant attacks in distinguishing a key alternating cipher from either a uniform random function or a uniform random permutation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    While \(g_0\) and \(g_r\) can be linear, the scenario that is relevant for the present work is when they are nonlinear.

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Acknowledgement

We thank the reviewers for their helpful comments which have helped in improving the paper.

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Correspondence to Subhabrata Samajder .

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Samajder, S., Sarkar, P. (2022). Distinguishing Error of Nonlinear Invariant Attacks. In: Isobe, T., Sarkar, S. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT 2022. INDOCRYPT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13774. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22912-1_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22912-1_14

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