Skip to main content

Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Based on SIDH

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information Security Applications (WISA 2022)

Abstract

Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes are cryptographic schemes for securely establishing a shared session key between a client and a server communicating over an insecure channel by using a low-entropy password. In this paper, we propose a PAKE based on SIDH, where the password is used to derive a torsion points obfuscator independent of ephemeral keys. We analyze its security and prove that it is secure in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model, assuming the hardness of the supersingular isogeny computational Diffie-Hellman (SI-CDH) problem.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that in the original SIDH [9] and SIKE [13] proposal, the starting curve was proposed to be \(y^2 = x^3 + x\). However, it was later realised to have some security issues as the number of 2 and 3-isogenous curves (up to isomorphism) to this curve are less than ideal. As such, in the second round submission to the NIST call for PQC standardization, the starting curve for SIKE is revised to be \(y^2 = x^3 + 6x^2 + x\). The reader is referred to [13, Section 1.3.2] for more details.

References

  1. Azarderakhsh, R., Jao, D., Koziel, B., LeGrow, J.T., Soukharev, V., Taraskin, O.: How not to create an isogeny-based PAKE. In: Conti, M., Zhou, J., Casalicchio, E., Spognardi, A. (eds.) ACNS 2020. LNCS, vol. 12146, pp. 169–186. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57808-4_9

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Encrypted key exchange: password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In: IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, S &P 1992, pp. 72–84. IEEE (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bellovin, S.M., Merritt, M.: Augmented encrypted key exchange: a password-based protocol secure against dictionary attacks and password file compromise. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 1993, pp. 244–250. ACM (1993)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Boyko, V., MacKenzie, P., Patel, S.: Provably secure password-authenticated key exchange using Diffie-Hellman. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 156–171. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45539-6_12

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attacks. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45539-6_11

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Couveignes, J.-M.: Hard homogeneous spaces. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2006/291 (1997). https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/291.pdf

  7. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44987-6_28

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. De Feo, L.: Mathematics of isogeny based cryptography. CoRR, abs/1711.04062 (2017). https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.04062.pdf

  9. De Feo, L., Jao, D., Plût, J.: Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. J. Math. Cryptol. 8(3), 209–247 (2014)

    MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  10. Galbraith, S.D.: Mathematics of Public Key Cryptography. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2012)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Galbraith, S.D., Vercauteren, F.: Computational problems in supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. Quantum Inf. Process. 17(10), 1–22 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11128-018-2023-6

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  12. Hao, F., Ryan, P.: J-PAKE: authenticated key exchange without PKI. In: Gavrilova, M.L., Tan, C.J.K., Moreno, E.D. (eds.) Transactions on Computational Science XI. LNCS, vol. 6480, pp. 192–206. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17697-5_10

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Jao, D., et al.: SIKE: supersingular isogeny key encapsulation (2017). https://sike.org

  14. Qi, M., Chen, J.: Authentication and key establishment protocol from supersingular isogeny for mobile environments. J. Supercomput. 78(5), 6371–6385 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-021-04121-8

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. Shor, P.W.: Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer. SIAM J. Comput. 26(5), 1484–1509 (1997)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Silverman, J.: The Arithmetic of Elliptic Curves. Graduate Texts in Mathematics, Springer, New York (2009)

    Book  MATH  Google Scholar 

  17. Taraskin, O., Soukharev, V., Jao, D., LeGrow, J.T.: Towards isogeny-based password-authenticated key establishment. J. Math. Cryptol. 15(1), 18–30 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc-2020-0071

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Terada, S., Yoneyama, K.: Password-based authenticated key exchange from standard isogeny assumptions. In: Steinfeld, R., Yuen, T.H. (eds.) ProvSec 2019. LNCS, vol. 11821, pp. 41–56. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_3

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Urbanik, D., Jao, D.: SoK: the problem landscape of SIDH. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM on ASIA Public-Key Cryptography Workshop, APKC 2018, pp. 53–60. ACM, New York (2018). https://doi.org/10.1145/3197507.3197516

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Theo Fanuela Prabowo .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Prabowo, T.F., Tan, C.H. (2023). Provably Secure Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Based on SIDH. In: You, I., Youn, TY. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13720. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25659-2_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25659-2_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-25658-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-25659-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics