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TTL Violation of DNS Resolvers in the Wild

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Passive and Active Measurement (PAM 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13882))

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Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) provides a scalable name resolution service. It uses extensive caching to improve its resiliency and performance; every DNS record contains a time-to-live (TTL) value, which specifies how long a DNS record can be cached before being discarded. Since the TTL can play an important role in both DNS security (e.g., determining a DNSSEC-signed response’s caching period) and performance (e.g., responsiveness of CDN-controlled domains), it is crucial to measure and understand how resolvers violate TTL.

Unfortunately, measuring how DNS resolvers manage TTL around the world remains difficult since it usually requires having the cooperation of many nodes spread across the globe. In this paper, we present a methodology that measures TTL-violating resolvers using an HTTP/S proxy service, which allows us to cover more than 27 K resolvers in 9.5 K ASes. Out of the 8,524 resolvers that we could measure through at least five different vantage points, we find that 8.74% of them extend the TTL arbitrarily, which potentially can degrade the performance of at least 38% of the popular websites that use CDNs. We also report that 44.1% of DNSSEC-validating resolvers incorrectly serve DNSSEC-signed responses from the cache even after their RRSIGs are expired.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Since we are only permitted to observe the only egress resolver IPs querying our authoritative servers, we label each querying IP as a resolver.

  2. 2.

    Our methodology can miss domains that delegate its name server to CDNs by replacing their NS records with CDN’s ones. We could potentially identify them by checking whether both of their web server and DNS server are managed by the same CDN. However, some companies (e.g., Alibaba and Google) also provide VPS hosting service, which will cause false-positive (e.g., the domain owner manages both servers within the same VPS), thus we only focus on the CNAME expansion information.

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Acknowledgments

We thank the anonymous reviewers and our shepherd, Paul Schmitt, for their helpful comments. We also thank BrightData for their credits to use the service. This research was supported in part by NSF grants CNS-2053363 and CNS-2051166, and 4-VA, a collaborative partnership for advancing the Commonwealth of Virginia.

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Correspondence to Taejoong Chung .

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Bhowmick, P., Ashiq, M.I., Deccio, C., Chung, T. (2023). TTL Violation of DNS Resolvers in the Wild. In: Brunstrom, A., Flores, M., Fiore, M. (eds) Passive and Active Measurement. PAM 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13882. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_23

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-28486-1

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