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Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on Reduced-Round PRINCEcore

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Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2022 (ICISC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13849))

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Abstract

The area of lightweight cryptography, i.e., ciphers with particularly low implementation costs, has drawn considerable attention over the last few years. PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher proposed by J. Borghoff et al. at ASIACRYPT 2012. In 2017, Ding et al. constructed a 4-round truncated impossible differential distinguisher. They treat S-boxes as ideal ones that any nonzero input difference could produce any nonzero output difference. Obviously, this is not true for the S-boxes in the real block ciphers. In this paper, after investigating the properties of both the S-box and the linear layer of PRINCE, we construct two types of 5-round impossible differential distinguishers. Then we exhibit two types of key-recovery attacks on 9 out of 12 rounds of PRINCEcore. The corresponding data complexities are \(2^{53.3}\) and \(2^{56.1}\) chosen plaintexts, respectively. Our results are the best impossible differential cryptanalysis on PRINCE as far as we know to date, and our attacks meet the security claims of the designers.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://github.com/ZLAa-oss/PRINCE.git.

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62072445). We thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Trusted Computing and Information Assurance Laboratory, Institute of Software Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100190, China

    Li Zhang, Wenling Wu & Yongxia Mao

  2. University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China

    Li Zhang, Wenling Wu & Yongxia Mao

Authors
  1. Li Zhang
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  2. Wenling Wu
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  3. Yongxia Mao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Wenling Wu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Hanyang University, Ansan, Korea (Republic of)

    Seung-Hyun Seo

  2. Hansung University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

    Hwajeong Seo

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Zhang, L., Wu, W., Mao, Y. (2023). Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on Reduced-Round PRINCEcore. In: Seo, SH., Seo, H. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology – ICISC 2022. ICISC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13849. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29371-9_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29371-9_4

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-29371-9

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