Abstract
In the design of critical systems, it is important to ensure a degree of formality so that we reason about safety and security at early stages of analysis and design, rather than detect problems later. Influenced by ideas from STPA we present a hierarchical analysis process that aims to justify the design and flow-down of derived critical requirements arising from safety hazards and security vulnerabilities identified at the system level. At each level, we verify that the design achieves the safety/security requirements by backing the analysis with formal modelling and proof using Event-B refinement. The formal model helps to identify hazards/vulnerabilities arising from the design and how they relate to the safety accidents/security losses being considered at this level. We then re-apply the same process to each component of the design in a hierarchical manner. Thus we use ideas from STPA, backed by Event-B models, to drive the design, replacing the system level requirements with component requirements. In doing so, we decompose critical requirements down to components, transforming them from abstract system level requirements, towards concrete solutions that we can implement correctly so that the hazards/vulnerabilities are eliminated.
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Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the following projects:
ā HiClass project (113213), which is part of the ATI Programme, a joint Government and industry investment to maintain and grow the UKās competitive position in civil aerospace design and manufacture.
ā HD-Sec project, which was funded by the Digital Security by Design (DSbD) Programme delivered by UKRI to support the DSbD ecosystem.
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Salehi Fathabadi, A., Snook, C., Dghaym, D., Hoang, T.S., Alotaibi, F., Butler, M. (2023). Designing Critical Systems Using Hierarchical STPA and Event-B. In: GlƤsser, U., Creissac Campos, J., MƩry, D., Palanque, P. (eds) Rigorous State-Based Methods. ABZ 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14010. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33163-3_17
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