Abstract
In the case of complete information, a reasonable solution to a negotiation process is Nash’s bargaining solution, in which we maximize the product of all agents’ utility gains. This is the only solution that does not depend on the order in which we list the agents, and does not change if we use a different scale for describing each agent’s utility. In this paper, we apply similar invariance criteria to a situation when practically all information is absent, and all we know is the smallest and largest possible gains. We show that in this situation, the only invariant negotiation strategy is to offer, to each agent, a certain percentage of the original request—and to select the percentage for which all such reduced requests can be satisfied.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation grants 1623190 (A Model of Change for Preparing a New Generation for Professional Practice in Computer Science), and HRD-1834620 and HRD-2034030 (CAHSI Includes), and by the AT&T Fellowship in Information Technology.
It was also supported by the program of the development of the Scientific-Educational Mathematical Center of Volga Federal District No. 075-02-2020-1478, and by a grant from the Hungarian National Research, Development and Innovation Office (NRDI).
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Svítek, M., Kosheleva, O., Kreinovich, V. (2023). In the Absence of Information, the only Reasonable Negotiation Scheme Is Offering a Certain Percentage of the Original Request: A Proof. In: Ceberio, M., Kreinovich, V. (eds) Uncertainty, Constraints, and Decision Making. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 484. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36394-8_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-36394-8_20
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