Abstract
This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments designed to study the effectiveness of leadership as a way to improve efficiency in team production. In a three-player minimum effort game framework, the research compares either endogenous or exogenous leadership (in the former, the leader is chosen in an auction, and in the latter, the leader is randomly selected) with a control treatment where no leadership is considered. Although contributions do not seem to be significantly different between both leadership treatments, the effort levels found are in fact higher with exogenous (random) leadership than in the control treatment. Conversely, this effect is not found with endogenous (intentional) leadership.
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Michel, C.E.J., Paredes, N.O., León, M., Tapia, P., Calle, F. (2023). Endogenous vs. Exogenous Leadership in Teamwork: An Socio-Economic Experimental Study. In: Gervasi, O., et al. Computational Science and Its Applications – ICCSA 2023 Workshops. ICCSA 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14109. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37120-2_29
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