Abstract
This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued to be better than Standard Deontic Logic at representing conditional and contrary-to-duty obligations, such as those exemplified by the notorious Chisholm’s puzzle. We consider the alethic-deontic system (E) and present the explicit version of this system (JE) by replacing the alethic Box-modality with proof terms and the dyadic deontic Circ-modality with justification terms. The explicit representation of strong factual detachment (SFD) is given and finally soundness and completeness of the system (JE) with respect to basic models and preference models is established.
F. Faroldi was supported by the Ambizione grant PZ00P1\(\_\)201906, A. Rohani and T. Studer were supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation grant 200020\(\_\)184625.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Artemov, S.: Explicit provability and constructive semantics. BSL 7(1), 1–36 (2001)
Artemov, S.: Justified common knowledge. TCS 357(1–3), 4–22 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2006.03.009
Artemov, S.: The ontology of justifications in the logical setting. Stud. Log. 100(1–2), 17–30 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-012-9387-x
Artemov, S., Fitting, M.: Justification Logic: Reasoning with Reasons. Cambridge Tracts in Mathematics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2019). https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108348034
Bucheli, S., Kuznets, R., Studer, T.: Justifications for common knowledge. Appl. Non-Classical Log. 21(1), 35–60 (2011). https://doi.org/10.3166/JANCL.21.35-60
Chisholm, R.M.: Contrary-to-duty imperatives and deontic logic. Analysis 24(2), 33–36 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/24.2.33
Danielsson, S.: Preference and Obligation. Studies in the Logic of Ethics. Filosofiska föreningen (1968)
Faroldi, F., Ghari, M., Lehmann, E., Studer, T.: Impossible and conflicting obligations in justification logic. In: Marra, A., Liu, F., Portner, P., Van De Putte, F. (eds.) Proceedings of DEON 2020 (2020)
Faroldi, F.L.G.: Deontic modals and hyperintensionality. Log. J. IGPL 27, 387–410 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzz011
Faroldi, F.L.G.: Hyperintensionality and Normativity. Springer, Heidelberg (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03487-0
Faroldi, F.L.G., Ghari, M., Lehmann, E., Studer, T.: Consistency and permission in deontic justification logic. J. Log. Comput. (2022). https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/exac045
Faroldi, F.L.G., Protopopescu, T.: All-things-considered ought via reasons in justification logic (2018). Preprint
Faroldi, F.L.G., Protopopescu, T.: A hyperintensional logical framework for deontic reasons. Log. J. IGPL 27, 411–433 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzz013
Fitting, M.: The logic of proofs, semantically. APAL 132(1), 1–25 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2004.04.009
van Fraassen, B.C.: The logic of conditional obligation. J. Philos. Log. 1(3/4), 417–438 (1972)
Gabbay, D., Horty, J., Parent, X., van der Meyden, R., van der Torre, L.: Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative System, vol. 2. College Publications (2021)
Hansson, B.: An analysis of some deontic logics. Noûs 3(4), 373–398 (1969)
Kokkinis, I., Maksimović, P., Ognjanović, Z., Studer, T.: First steps towards probabilistic justification logic. Log. J. IGPL 23(4), 662–687 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzv025
Kuznets, R., Studer, T.: Logics of Proofs and Justifications. Studies in Logic. College Publications (2019)
Kuznets, R., Marin, S., Straßburger, L.: Justification logic for constructive modal logic. J. Appl. Log. 8, 2313–2332 (2021)
Kuznets, R., Studer, T.: Justifications, ontology, and conservativity. In: Bolander, T., Braüner, T., Ghilardi, S., Moss, L. (eds.) Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 9, pp. 437–458. College Publications (2012)
Lehmann, E., Studer, T.: Subset models for justification logic. In: Iemhoff, R., Moortgat, M., de Queiroz, R. (eds.) WoLLIC 2019. LNCS, vol. 11541, pp. 433–449. Springer, Heidelberg (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-59533-6_26
Lewis, D.K.: Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Cambridge (1973)
Lewis, D.K.: Semantic analyses for dyadic deontic logic. In: Stenlund, S., Henschen-Dahlquist, A.M., Lindahl, L., Nordenfelt, L., Odelstad, J. (eds.) Logical Theory and Semantic Analysis. Synthese Library, vol. 63, pp. 1–14. Springer, Dordrecht (1974)
Parent, X., van der Torre, L.: Introduction to Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. Texts in Logic and Reasoning. College Publications (2018)
Parent, X.: A complete axiom set for Hansson’s deontic logic DSDL2. Log. J. IGPL 18(3), 422–429 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp050
Parent, X.: Maximality vs. optimality in dyadic deontic logic. J. Philos. Log. 43(6), 1101–1128 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9308-0
Parent, X.: Completeness of Åqvist’s systems E and F. Rev. Symb. Log. 8(1), 164–177 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020314000367
Renne, B.: Dynamic epistemic logic with justification. Ph.D. thesis, City University of New York (2008)
Rohani, A., Studer, T.: Explicit non-normal modal logic. In: Silva, A., Wassermann, R., de Queiroz, R. (eds.) WoLLIC 2021. LNCS, vol. 13038, pp. 64–81. Springer, Cham (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88853-4_5
Rohani, A., Studer, T.: Explicit non-normal modal logic. J. Log. Comput. (in print)
Studer, T.: Decidability for some justification logics with negative introspection. JSL 78(2), 388–402 (2013). https://doi.org/10.2178/jsl.7802030
Xu, C., Wang, Y., Studer, T.: A logic of knowing why. Synthese 198, 1259–1285 (2021)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
A Soundness and Completeness with Respect to Basic Models
A Soundness and Completeness with Respect to Basic Models
Theorem 4
System \(\textsf{JE}_{\textsf{CS}}\) is sound with respect to the class of all basic models.
Proof
The proof is by induction on the length of derivations in \(\textsf{JE}_{\textsf{CS}}\). For an arbitrary basic model \(\varepsilon \), soundness of the propositional axioms is trivial and soundness of \(\textsf{S5}\) axioms \(\textsf{j}, \textsf{jt}, \textsf{j4}, \textsf{j5}, \mathsf {j+}\) immediately follows from the definition of basic evaluation and factivity. We just check the cases for the axioms containing justification terms. Suppose \(\textsf{JE}_{\textsf{CS}}\vdash F\) and F is an instance of:
-
(COK): Suppose \(\varepsilon \Vdash [t] (B \rightarrow C/A)\) and \(\varepsilon \Vdash [s] (B/A)\). Thus we have
$$ (B \rightarrow C ,A) \in \varepsilon (t) \quad \text {and}\quad (B,A) \in \varepsilon (s). $$By the definition of basic model, we have \(\varepsilon (t) \ominus \varepsilon (s) \subseteq \varepsilon (t \cdot s)\) and as a result \((C,A) \in \varepsilon (t \cdot s)\), which means \(\varepsilon \Vdash [t \cdot s](C/A)\).
-
(Nec): Suppose \(\varepsilon \Vdash (\lambda : A)\). Thus \(A \in \varepsilon (\lambda )\). By the definition of \(\textsf{n}(\varepsilon (\lambda ))\) we have \((A,B) \in \textsf{n}(\varepsilon (\lambda ))\) for any \(B \in \textsf{Fm}\) and by the definition of basic evaluation \(\textsf{n}(\varepsilon (\lambda )) \subseteq \varepsilon (\textsf{n}(\lambda )) \), so \((A,B) \in \varepsilon (\textsf{n}(\lambda ))\), which means \(\varepsilon \Vdash [\textsf{n}(\lambda )] (A/B) \).
-
(Ext): Suppose \(\varepsilon \Vdash \lambda : (A \leftrightarrow B)\), so \((A \leftrightarrow B) \in \varepsilon (\lambda )\). Since \(\varepsilon (\lambda ) \odot \varepsilon (t) \subseteq \varepsilon (\textsf{e}(t, \lambda ))\), we have \((C,B) \in \varepsilon (\textsf{e}(t, \lambda )) \) if \((C,A) \in \varepsilon (t)\). Hence \(\varepsilon \Vdash ( [t] (C/A) \rightarrow [\textsf{e}(t, \lambda )] (C/B))\).
-
(Sh): Suppose \(\varepsilon \Vdash [t] (C/A \wedge B)\), then \((C,(A \wedge B)) \in \varepsilon (t)\). By definition of \(\nabla (\varepsilon (t))\) we have \((B \rightarrow C , A) \in \nabla (\varepsilon (t))\) and by definition of basic models, \(\nabla \varepsilon (t) \subseteq \varepsilon (\nabla t)\). As a result, \(((B \rightarrow C),A) \in \varepsilon (\nabla t) \) which means \(\varepsilon \Vdash [\nabla t](B \rightarrow C/A)\).
For the axioms (Abs) and (Id) soundness is immediate from the definition of basic evaluation. \(\square \)
Theorem 5
System \(\textsf{JE}_{\textsf{CS}}\) is complete with respect to the class of all basic models.
Proof
Given a maximal consistent \(\varGamma \), we define the canonical model \(\varepsilon ^c\) induced by \(\varGamma \) as follows:
-
\(\varepsilon ^c _{\varGamma } (P):=1 \), if \(P \in \varGamma \) and \(\varepsilon ^c :=0\), if \(P \notin \varGamma \);
-
\(\varepsilon ^c _{\varGamma } (\lambda ) :=\{ F \ | \ \lambda :F \in \varGamma \}\);
-
\(\varepsilon ^c _{\varGamma } (t) :=\{ (F,G) \ | \ [t](F/G) \in \varGamma \}\).
We first show that \(\varepsilon ^c\) is a basic evaluation. Conditions (i)–(v) follow immediately from the maximal consistency of \(\varGamma \) and axioms of \(\textsf{j}- \textsf{j5}\). Conditions (1)–(6) are obtained from the axioms (Abs), (COK), (Nec), (Id), (Ext), and (Sh). Let us only show (1) and (3).
To check condition (1), suppose \((C,B) \in \varepsilon ^c (t) \ominus \varepsilon ^c (s)\). Then there is an \(A \in \textsf{Fm}\) such that \((A \rightarrow C , B) \in \varepsilon ^c (t)\) and \((A,B) \in \varepsilon ^c (s)\). By the definition of canonical model \([t](A\rightarrow C /B) \in \varGamma \) and \([s](A/B) \in \varGamma \), by maximal consistency of \(\varGamma \) and axiom (COK) we have \([t \cdot s](C/B) \in \varGamma \), which gives \((C/B) \in \varepsilon ^c (t \cdot s)\).
To check condition (3), suppose \((A,B) \in \textsf{n}(\varepsilon ^c (\lambda ))\). Then \(A \in \varepsilon ^c (\lambda )\), which means \(\lambda :A \in \varGamma \). By maximal consistency of \(\varGamma \) and axiom (Nec) we get \([\textsf{n}(\lambda )](A/B) \in \varGamma \). By the definition of canonical model we conclude \((A,B) \in \varepsilon ^c (\textsf{n}(\lambda ))\). Thus \(\varepsilon ^c\) is a basic evaluation.
The truth lemma states:
which is established as usual by induction on the structure of F. In case \(F= [t](A/B)\), we have \([t](A/B) \in \varGamma \) iff \((A,B) \in \varepsilon ^c (t)\) iff \(\varepsilon ^c \Vdash [t](A/B)\).
Due to axiom \(\textsf{jt}\), \(\varepsilon ^c\) is factive by the following reasoning: if \(\varepsilon ^c \Vdash \lambda : F\), we get by the truth lemma that \(\lambda : F \in \varGamma \). By the maximal consistency of \(\varGamma \) we have \(F \in \varGamma \) which means \(\varepsilon ^c \Vdash F\) by the truth lemma. \(\square \)
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Faroldi, F.L.G., Rohani, A., Studer, T. (2023). Conditional Obligations in Justification Logic. In: Hansen, H.H., Scedrov, A., de Queiroz, R.J. (eds) Logic, Language, Information, and Computation. WoLLIC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13923. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39784-4_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39784-4_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-39783-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-39784-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)