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Utilising Redundancy to Enhance Security of Safety-Critical Systems

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Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2023 Workshops (SAFECOMP 2023)

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Abstract

For many safety-critical systems, implementing modern cybersecurity protection mechanisms is hindered by legacy design and high re-certification costs. Since such systems are typically designed to be highly reliable, they usually contain a large number of redundant components used to achieve fault tolerance. In this paper, we discuss challenges in utilising redundancy inherently present in the architectures of safety-critical systems to enhance system cybersecurity protection. We consider classic redundant architectures and analyse their ability to protect against cyberattacks. By evaluating the likelihood of a successful cyberattack on a redundant architecture under different implementation conditions, we conclude that redundancy in combination with diversity has better potential to be utilised for cybersecurity protection.

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Correspondence to Elena Troubitsyna .

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Troubitsyna, E. (2023). Utilising Redundancy to Enhance Security of Safety-Critical Systems. In: Guiochet, J., Tonetta, S., Schoitsch, E., Roy, M., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2023 Workshops. SAFECOMP 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14182. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40953-0_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40953-0_16

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-40952-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-40953-0

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