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DNN Model Theft Through Trojan Side-Channel on Edge FPGA Accelerator

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Applied Reconfigurable Computing. Architectures, Tools, and Applications (ARC 2023)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a novel hardware trojan assisted side-channel attack to reverse engineer DNN architectures on edge FPGA accelerators. In particular, our attack targets the widely-used Versatile Tensor Accelerator (VTA). A hardware trojan is employed to track the memory transactions by monitoring the AXI interface signals of VTA’s submodules. The memory side-channel information is leaked through a UART port, which reveals the DNN architecture information. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack and highlight the need for robust security measures to protect DNN intellectual property (IP) models that are deployed on edge FPGA platforms.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported in part by NTU-DESAY SV Research Program 2018–0980; and in part by the Ministry of Education, Singapore, under its Academic Research Fund Tier 2, under Grant MOE-T2EP20121-0008.

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Correspondence to Srivatsan Chandrasekar .

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Chandrasekar, S., Lam, SK., Thambipillai, S. (2023). DNN Model Theft Through Trojan Side-Channel on Edge FPGA Accelerator. In: Palumbo, F., Keramidas, G., Voros, N., Diniz, P.C. (eds) Applied Reconfigurable Computing. Architectures, Tools, and Applications. ARC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14251. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42921-7_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-42921-7_10

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-42920-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-42921-7

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