Abstract
In modern railway systems, verification of system and software are usually performed independently, even though the refinement from system to software level is covered. However, experience shows that this conventional approach is error-prone and inadequate for complex functions that are increasingly common. Bugs resulting from the gap between system and software levels often go undetected until late in the development process, making corrections costly and raising concerns about other bugs that may have been missed. In an ideal scenario, comprehensive verification would identify such bugs early on, regardless of the gap. This paper introduces a verification approach that intends to bridge the gap between system and software levels through the formal verification of system level safety properties on a model of the software. Its application on a pilot project revealed several safety critical bugs that would not have been detected using the aforementioned activities.
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Halchin, A., Sylla, A.N., Benyagoub, S., Feliachi, A., Fonteneau, Y., Leger, S. (2023). Integral Formal Proof: A Verification Approach Bridging the Gap Between System and Software Levels in Railway Systems. In: Milius, B., Collart-Dutilleul, S., Lecomte, T. (eds) Reliability, Safety, and Security of Railway Systems. Modelling, Analysis, Verification, and Certification. RSSRail 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14198. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43366-5_10
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