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Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus

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Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems (FMICS 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14290))

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Abstract

Tools and techniques for assessing the possibilities and impacts of attacks on IT systems are necessary to ensure the IT systems upon which society depends on continue to operate despite targeted attacks. This reality compels the development of intuitive brainstorming formalisms like attack-defense trees. With an attack-defense tree and a suitable system description, one can validate if a system succumbs to or withstands a described attack. Yet having established a secure system, it is still necessary to understand if and how system security may or may not be compromised or improved when the system requires modifications. Our research describes how we develop and implement a modeling methodology to resolve attacker-oriented refinement between systems.

Work partially supported by the Villum Investigator grant S4OS and the FNRS PDF - T013721 project.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    \(\texttt{Resident}\) abbreviated to R, \(\texttt{House}\) abbreviated to H and \(\texttt{Attacker}\) abbreviated to A.

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Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Linda Warnier for proofreading this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

    Kim Guldstrand Larsen & Danny Bøgsted Poulsen

  2. UCLouvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium

    Axel Legay

Authors
  1. Kim Guldstrand Larsen
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  2. Axel Legay
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  3. Danny Bøgsted Poulsen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Danny Bøgsted Poulsen .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Povo, Italy

    Alessandro Cimatti

  2. NASA Langley Research Center, AMA-NASA LaRC, Hampton, VA, USA

    Laura Titolo

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Larsen, K.G., Legay, A., Poulsen, D.B. (2023). Refinement of Systems with an Attacker Focus. In: Cimatti, A., Titolo, L. (eds) Formal Methods for Industrial Critical Systems. FMICS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14290. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-43681-9_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-43680-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-43681-9

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