Abstract
False data injection (FDI) attacks pose a significant threat to the reliability of power system state estimation (PSSE). Recently, graph signal processing (GSP)-based detectors have been shown to enable the detection of well-designed cyber attacks named unobservable FDI attacks. However, current detectors, including GSP-based detectors, do not consider the impact of secured sensors on the detection process; thus, they may have limited power, especially in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. In this paper, we propose a novel FDI attack detection method that incorporates both knowledge of the locations of secured sensors and the GSP properties of power system states (voltages). We develop the secured-sensors-and-graph-Laplacian-based generalized likelihood ratio test (SSGL-GLRT) that integrates the secured data and the graph smoothness properties of the state variables. Furthermore, we introduce a generalization of the method that allows the use of different high-pass GSP filters together with prior knowledge of the locations of the secured sensors. Then, we develop the SSGL-GLRT for a distributed PSSE based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed method significantly improves the probability of detecting FDI attacks compared to existing GSP-based detectors, achieving an increase of up to 30% in the detection probability for the same false alarm rate by integrating secured sensor location information.
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Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by the Next Generation Internet (NGI) program, the Jabotinsky Scholarship from the Israel Ministry of Technology and Science, the Israel Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy, National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korean government (MSIT) (No. RS-2023-00210018), NSF grants CNS-2148128, EPCN-2144634, EPCN-2231350, and by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy under the Solar Energy Technology Office Award Number DE-EE0008769. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Energy or the United States Government.
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Appendix: Concavity of \(\mathcal {Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta },\mathbf{{a}})\)
Appendix: Concavity of \(\mathcal {Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta },\mathbf{{a}})\)
In order to show that the function \(\mathcal {Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta },\mathbf{{a}})\) from (8) is a concave function w.r.t \(\boldsymbol{\theta }\) and \(\mathbf{{a}}\), we need to show that the Hessian matrix of the second-order partial derivatives of \(-\mathcal {Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta },\mathbf{{a}})\) is a positive semidefinite matrix. It can be seen that the Hessian matrix of \(-\mathcal {Q}(\boldsymbol{\theta },\mathbf{{a}})\) w.r.t. the vector \([\boldsymbol{\theta }^T,\mathbf{{a}}^T]^T\) is
The Hessian is a sum of two matrices. In the following, we show that each one of these matrices is positive semidefinite, which implies that the Hessian is a positive semidefinite matrix. First, it can be seen that the matrix \(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{{B}}&{} \mathbf{{0}}\\ \mathbf{{0}}&{} {\mathbf{{M}}} \end{pmatrix}\) is a positive semidefinite matrix because it is a block diagonal matrix of two positive semidefinite matrices (see the definitions of \(\mathbf{{B}}\) and \({\mathbf{{M}}}\) in (1) and (8), respectively). Second, the matrix \(\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{{H}}^T\mathbf{{R}}^{-1}\mathbf{{H}}&{} \mathbf{{H}}^T\mathbf{{R}}^{-1} \\ \mathbf{{R}}^{-1}\mathbf{{H}}&{} \mathbf{{R}}^{-1} \end{pmatrix}\) is a positive semidefinite matrix since it can be verified that its Schur complement,
is a positive semidefinite matrix [13].
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Morgenstern, G., Dabush, L., Kim, J., Anderson, J., Zussman, G., Routtenberg, T. (2023). Invited Paper: Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Power Systems Using a Secured-Sensors and Graph-Based Method. In: Dolev, S., Schieber, B. (eds) Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems. SSS 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14310. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44274-2_18
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