Abstract
The edit distance is a metric widely used in genomics to measure the similarity of two DNA chains. Motivated by privacy concerns, we propose a 2PC protocol to compute the edit distance while preserving the privacy of the inputs. Since the edit distance algorithm can be expressed as a mixed-circuit computation, our approach uses protocols based on secret-sharing schemes like Tinier and SPD\({\mathbb {Z}}_{2^k}\); and also daBits to perform domain conversion and edaBits to perform arithmetic comparisons. We modify the Wagner-Fischer edit distance algorithm, aiming at reducing the number of rounds of the protocol, and achieve a flexible protocol with a trade-off between rounds and multiplications. We implement our proposal in the MP-SPDZ framework, and our experiments show that it reduces the execution time respectively by 81% and 54% for passive and active security with respect to a baseline implementation in a LAN. The experiments also show that our protocol reduces traffic by two orders of magnitude compared to a BMR-MASCOT implementation.
The author was partially supported by the CyTeD program grant 522RT0131.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
We will occasionally replace the parentheses with a subscript for the matrices D and t. That is, D(i, j) will be written as \(D_{i,j}\) and t(i, j) as \(t_{i, j}\).
- 3.
Any MPC protocol that implements an \(\mathcal {F}_{\text {edaBits}}\) functionality as described in [14].
- 4.
We will not consider here the case \(\vert \mathcal {P}_{U, W} \vert = 1\), since Algorithm 2 returns the only path in \(\mathcal {P}_{U, W}\), which is trivial. Henceforth, we will consider only \(\vert \mathcal {P}_{U, W} \vert > 1\). The case \(\mathcal {P}_{U, W} = \emptyset \) is also not considered due to the definition of optimality.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
All these experiments use daBits and edaBits and box-size \(\tau =3\).
- 8.
Although there are other alternatives for actively secure GC protocols, we choose BMR because it is the only available GC-based protocol for malicious adversaries in MP-SDPZ. This allows us to make comparisons in the same “ground”.
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Vanegas, H., Cabarcas, D., Aranha, D.F. (2023). Privacy-Preserving Edit Distance Computation Using Secret-Sharing Two-Party Computation. In: Aly, A., Tibouchi, M. (eds) Progress in Cryptology – LATINCRYPT 2023. LATINCRYPT 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14168. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44469-2_4
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