Abstract
This paper explores the cooperation mechanisms for the prisoner’s dilemma game, a canonical example for studying cooperation mechanisms, with Bayesian games. By the approach allowing simultaneous moves with the assumption that the players might be self-interested or norm-following, we establish four possible Bayesian game models, all of which are cooperation mechanisms for the prisoner’s dilemma game except for the model in which one of the two players must be self-interested.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities 22JJD520001.
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Xiong, W. (2023). Cooperation Mechanisms for the Prisoner’s Dilemma with Bayesian Games. In: Alechina, N., Herzig, A., Liang, F. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14329. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45558-2_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45558-2_22
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