Abstract
Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is a deliberate technique used to induce faults in a device by exposing it to electromagnetic interference. ASCON is a lightweight cipher that offers better performance than other ciphers, making it suitable for IoT devices with limited resources. However, the use of lightweight ciphers on hardware devices can pose a significant security risk against EMFI attacks, which can manipulate both the device’s behavior and the implemented encryption algorithms. Our research used the ChipShouter, a specialized tool designed specifically for EMFI attacks on electronic devices. During these attacks, we intentionally exposed the M5STACK ESP32 Timer Camera (OV3660) module, on which we implement the ASCON algorithm, to electromagnetic pulses emitted by the ChipShouter. These pulses were directed at the PSRAM of the target device, where essential values such as plaintext, associated data, nonce, key, etc., are stored. Through the introduction of these pulses, we successfully inject faults and demonstrate the vulnerability of ASCON to EMFI attacks. To evaluate the impact, We test with different string sizes for input plaintext, namely 250 Kb, 500 Kb, and 1 MB. The results revealed that the fault injection percentages were as follows: 24% for the 250 Kb string size, 54% for the 500 Kb size, and 90% for the 1 MB size.
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Narayanan, V., Sankaran, S. (2024). Electromagnetic Fault Injection Attack on ASCON Using ChipShouter. In: Puthal, D., Mohanty, S., Choi, BY. (eds) Internet of Things. Advances in Information and Communication Technology. IFIPIoT 2023. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, vol 683. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45878-1_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45878-1_9
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