Abstract
This paper introduces a new cryptographic Internet voting protocol, which offers individual verifiability and vote privacy even on completely untrustworthy voting devices. The core idea is to minimize the voting client to a simple device capable of scanning a QR code, sending its content to the web server of the included URL, and displaying a response message to the voter. Today, QR code scanners are pre-installed into mobile devices, and users are familiar to using them for many different purposes. By reducing the voting client to an existing functionality of the voters’ personal device, the implementation of the protocol is simplified significantly compared to other protocols. The protocol itself can be seen as a variant of Chaum’s code voting scheme with an elegant solution to the problem of distributing the trust to multiple authorities. The approach is based on BLS signatures and verifiable mix-nets. It relies on trustworthy printing and mailing services during the election setup.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
In our protocol, we minimize the size of the signatures by using \(G_1\) for the signatures and \(G_2\) for the public keys, but the roles of the groups are interchangeable.
References
Aumann, Y., Lindell, Y.: Security against covert adversaries: efficient protocols for realistic adversaries. J. Cryptol. 23(2), 281–343 (2010)
Bayer, S., Groth, J.: Efficient zero-knowledge argument for correctness of a shuffle. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 263–280. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_17
Chaum, D.: SureVote: technical overview. In: WOTE 2001, 1st Workshop On Trustworthy Elections. Tomales Bay, USA (2001)
Haenni, R., Koenig, R.E., Locher, P., Dubuis, E.: CHVote protocol specification - version 3.4. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2017/325 (2022)
Joaquim, R., Ribeiro, C., Ferreira, P.: VeryVote: a voter verifiable code voting system. In: 2nd International Conference on E-Voting and Identity, VoteID 2009, Luxembourg, pp. 106–121 (2009)
Kulyk, O., Ludwig, J., Volkamer, M., Koenig, R.E., Locher, P.: Usable verifiable secrecy-preserving e-voting. In: 6th International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, E-Vote-ID 2021, Bregenz, Austria, pp. 337–353 (2021)
Oppliger, R.: How to address the secure platform problem for remote internet voting. In: 5th Conference on “Sicherheit in Informationssystemen”, SIS 2002, Austria, Vienna, pp. 153–173 (2002)
Renold, H., Esseiva, O., Hofer, T.: Swiss Post Voting System - System specification - Version 1.2.0. Technical report, Swiss Post Ltd., Bern, Switzerland (2022)
Ristenpart, T., Yilek, S.: The power of proofs-of-possession: securing multiparty signatures against rogue-key attacks. In: Naor, M. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2007. LNCS, vol. 4515, pp. 228–245. Springer, Heidelberg (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72540-4_13
Ryan, P.Y.A., Teague, V.: Pretty good democracy. In: 17th International Workshop on Security Protocols, SPW 2009, Cambridge, UK, pp. 111–130 (2009)
Sakemi, Y., Kobayashi, T., Saito, T., Wahby, R.S.: Pairing-friendly curves. Internet-draft, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) (2022)
Scholl, P., Simkin, M., Siniscalchi, L.: Multiparty computation with covert security and public verifiability. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2021/366 (2021)
Terelius, B., Wikström, D.: Proofs of restricted shuffles. In: Bernstein, D.J., Lange, T. (eds.) AFRICACRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6055, pp. 100–113. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_7
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2024 International Financial Cryptography Association
About this paper
Cite this paper
Haenni, R., Koenig, R.E., Locher, P. (2024). Private Internet Voting on Untrusted Voting Devices. In: Essex, A., et al. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops. FC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13953. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_4
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-48805-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-48806-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)