Abstract
Deterministic authenticated encryption (DAE) provides data integrity and authenticity with certain robustness. Previous DAE schemes for low memory are based on block ciphers (BCs) or tweakable block ciphers (TBCs), which can be implemented with 3s bits of memory for s-bit security. On the other hand, schemes based on cryptographic permutations have attracted many researchers and standardization bodies. However, existing permutation-based DAEs require at least 4s bits, or even 5s bits of memory. In this paper, \(\textsf{PALM}\), a new permutation-based DAE mode that can be implemented only with 3s bits of memory is proposed, implying that permutation-based DAEs achieve a competitive memory size with BC- and TBC-based DAEs. Our hardware implementation of \(\textsf{PALM}\), instantiated with PHOTON\(_{256}\) for 128-bit security, achieves 3,585 GE, comparable with the state-of-the-art TBC-based DAE. Finally, optimality of 3s bits of memory of \(\textsf{PALM}\) is shown.
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Notes
- 1.
There may be a case that the tag comparison is included in hardware by using additional memory. As long as the comparison targets are all SIV-like schemes with the same tag size, as in this paper, there is no impact on the fairness of the comparison by whether or not T is counted during decryption. The situation changes when side-channel attack (SCA) is a concern. In such a case, tag comparison needs an SCA protection [16] and should be included in the hardware implementation. This increases the memory requirement in Table 1 in all the schemes but HADDOC that anyway stores the tag during encryption and decryption.
- 2.
The designers claim that “since key bits and tweak bits are used without schedule in TEM-PHOTON, in the case where they can be sent multiple times by the external provider, local storage can be saved." They also claim that “When key and tweak has to be stored locally, they can be stored using 256 regular 1-bit flip-flops.” As discussed above, we argue that the latter is the most natural implementation.
- 3.
Specifically, our security bound is \(\min \left\{ k- \log _2 (b-k), \frac{b}{2} \right\} \) bits. Since \(\log _2 (b-k)\) is small, we omit the term in this paper.
- 4.
For a forward query \(X\) to \(\pi \) (resp. inverse query \(Y\) to \(\pi ^{-1}\)), the response \(Y\) (resp. \(X\)) is defined as \(Y\xleftarrow {\$}\{0,1\}^b\backslash \mathcal {L}_\pi ^2\) (resp. \(X\xleftarrow {\$}\{0,1\}^b\backslash \mathcal {L}_\pi ^1\)), and the query-response pair \((X, Y)\) is added to \(\mathcal {L}_\pi \): \(\mathcal {L}_\pi \xleftarrow {\cup }\mathcal {L}_\pi \cup \{(X, Y)\}\).
- 5.
Specifically, internal values of the PRNG part of the decryption are not revealed as long as no forgery occurs (\(\textsf{bad}_6\)). Hence, the collision event does not yield an attack.
- 6.
Note that a collision for the last output block \(W_{d_\beta }^{(\beta )}\), which is defined by using a tag, is not considered in this event, and instead considered in \(\textsf{bad}_4\).
- 7.
Since \(V_{i+1}^{(\alpha )} = W_{i}^{(\alpha )}\) and \(V_{j+1}^{(\beta )} = W_{j}^{(\beta )}\), \(\textsf{bad}_4\) covers collisions with the input blocks.
- 8.
Obtained by dividing the primitive’s latency with the message block size.
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Hiraga, Y., Naito, Y., Sasaki, Y., Sugawara, T. (2023). Permutation-Based Deterministic Authenticated Encryption with Minimum Memory Size. In: Athanasopoulos, E., Mennink, B. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14411. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49187-0_18
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