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Mechanism Design for Time-Varying Value Tasks in High-Load Edge Computing Markets

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Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14462))

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Abstract

A large number of computing task requests are generated by user terminals during peak hours in high-demand areas, but the resource capacity of edge servers is limited. It is necessary to design appropriate resource allocation and pricing mechanisms to address this resource competition dilemma. This paper proposes an auction-based mechanism called GMPO from an economic perspective. A market where multiple buyers and sellers compete with each other is considered, and the auction mechanisms is used to prevent these entities from falsely reporting information. As an extension of the concept of the age of information, the value of delay-sensitive computing tasks will decrease over time. This paper allocates resources greedily according to defined priorities and charge based on critical prices. The experiment results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can effectively improve social welfare and guarantee the economic properties of auctions.

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Acknowledgment

This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 62172124). It was also supported by the Shenzhen Basic Research Program (Project No. JCYJ20190806143011274).

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Correspondence to Hongwei Du .

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Li, Q., Wang, Z., Du, H. (2024). Mechanism Design for Time-Varying Value Tasks in High-Load Edge Computing Markets. In: Wu, W., Guo, J. (eds) Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. COCOA 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14462. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49614-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49614-1_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-49613-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-49614-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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