Abstract
In this paper, we study a new epistemic modal operator, termed hope, which has been introduced recently in the context of a novel epistemic reasoning framework for distributed multi-agent systems with arbitrarily (“byzantine”) faulty agents. It has been proved that both preconditions of actions used in agent protocols, as well as assertions about the epistemic states of agents obtained for analysis purposes, need to be restricted in a particular way for such systems. Hope has been proposed as the most promising candidate for analysis purposes, and defined in terms of the standard knowledge operator. To support the challenging next step of defining the semantics of common hope and eventual common hope, which are crucial for the analysis of fault-tolerant distributed agreement algorithms, we provide a suitable axiomatization of individual hope that avoids knowledge altogether, and prove its (strong) soundness and (strong) completeness.
PhD student in the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) doctoral program LogiCS (W1255).
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Notes
- 1.
In case of synchronous systems, a causal structure called centipede is both necessary and sufficient for verifying knowledge (when considering full-information protocols) as shown in [1].
- 2.
We note that this paper has been accepted to ESSLLI2019 Student Session. Since then (building on top of the results presented here), new results have been obtained. See [5] for an example of a distributed computing problem analyzed using epistemic logic where the notion of eventual common hope shows up. See [2] where it is shown how one can make the logic of hope (introduced here) not depend on the \(\textit{correct}_{i}\) atomic propositions. It turns out that, essentially, the logic of \(\mathsf {KB4_n}\) can be taken as an alternative logic for hope. Interestinly, in [6] Goubault et al. show that the logic of \(\mathsf {KB4_n}\) also plays a crucial role in studying systems with crash failures. See [2] for further discussion.
- 3.
In literature on modal logics, a statement of this type is called Lindenbaum’s Lemma.
- 4.
In literature on modal logics, a statement of this type is called Truth Lemma.
- 5.
In literature on modal logics, a statement of this type is called Correctness Lemma.
- 6.
Note that \(W^{c} \ne \emptyset \) since any \(\mathscr {H}\)-consistent set can be extended to a maximal \(\mathscr {H}\)-consistent set according to Lemma 2.
- 7.
We again note that this paper has been accepted to ESSLLI2019 Student Session. Since then (building on top of the results presented here), new results have been obtained. See [2] where a logic containing both individual knowledge and individual hope has been introduced as well as a logic containing both common knowledge and common hope.
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Acknowledgments
I am immensly grateful to Ulrich Schmid and Roman Kuznets for inspiring discussions, suggestions and constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very much appreciated suggestions, in particular, regarding the need to justify the axiomatization, which allowed me to considerably strengthen the paper.
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Fruzsa, K. (2024). Hope for Epistemic Reasoning with Faulty Agents!. In: Pavlova, A., Pedersen, M.Y., Bernardi, R. (eds) Selected Reflections in Language, Logic, and Information. ESSLLI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14354. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50628-4_6
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