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Key-Recovery Attacks on CRAFT and WARP

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Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13742))

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Abstract

This paper considers the security of CRAFT and WARP. We present a practical key-recovery attack on full-round CRAFT in the related-key setting with only one differential characteristic, and the theoretical time complexity of the attack is \(2^{36.09}\) full-round encryptions. The attack is verified in practice. The test result indicates that the theoretical analysis is valid, and it takes about 15.69 h to retrieve the key. A full-round key-recovery attack on WARP in the related-key setting is proposed, and the time complexity is \(2^{44.58}\) full-round encryptions. The theoretical attack is implemented on a round-reduced version of WARP, which guarantees validity. Besides, we give a 33-round multiple zero-correlation linear attack on WARP, which is the longest attack on the cipher in the single-key attack setting. We note that the attack results in this paper do not threaten the security of CRAFT and WARP as the designers do not claim security under the related-key attack setting.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    https://github.com/SunLing134340/CRAFT-and-WARP.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve the quality of the paper. The research leading to these results has received funding from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62272273, Grant No. 62002201, Grant No. 62032014), the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2018YFA0704702), and the Major Basic Research Project of Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province, China (Grant No. ZR202010220025). Ling Sun gratefully acknowledges the support by the Program of TaiShan Scholars Special Fund for young scholars.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China

    Ling Sun, Wei Wang & Meiqin Wang

  2. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P. O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, China

    Ling Sun

  3. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China

    Ling Sun, Wei Wang & Meiqin Wang

  4. Quan Cheng Shandong Laboratory, Jinan, China

    Ling Sun & Meiqin Wang

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  1. Ling Sun
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  2. Wei Wang
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Correspondence to Meiqin Wang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Inria and École Polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France

    Benjamin Smith

  2. Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Windsor, Windsor, ON, Canada

    Huapeng Wu

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Sun, L., Wang, W., Wang, M. (2024). Key-Recovery Attacks on CRAFT and WARP. In: Smith, B., Wu, H. (eds) Selected Areas in Cryptography. SAC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13742. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_4

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