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Formal Analysis of Interactions Between Safety and Security Requirements

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The Practice of Formal Methods

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14781))

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Abstract

Modern safety-critical control systems rely on networking to provide safety-critical functions. Network technologies not only offers a variety of benefits but also introduces cybersecurity threats. Exploiting security vulnerabilities might result in a loss of control and situation awareness as well as directly threaten safety. Therefore, the development of safety-critical systems should encompass a systematic analysis of the impact of potential cyberattacks on safety and explicit identification of security requirements early in the system development life cycle. In this paper, we propose a formal approach to modelling networked safety-critical systems within Event-B framework. We demonstrate how modelling and refinement in Event-B can systematically identify mutual interdependencies between safety and security and facilitate deriving explicit security requirements necessary for achieving system safety.

The author would like to thank Inna Vistbakka for long-standing cooperation that contributed to this paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. KTH – Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    Elena Troubitsyna

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  1. Elena Troubitsyna
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Correspondence to Elena Troubitsyna .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of York, York, UK

    Ana Cavalcanti

  2. University of York, York, UK

    James Baxter

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Troubitsyna, E. (2024). Formal Analysis of Interactions Between Safety and Security Requirements. In: Cavalcanti, A., Baxter, J. (eds) The Practice of Formal Methods. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14781. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66673-5_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66673-5_8

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