Abstract
Wireless networks inherently rely on a shared medium, making them exposed to jamming attacks. In this paper, we present MAG-JAM, a novel solution for jamming detection in static and mobile scenarios leveraging the physical layer properties of wireless communication by analyzing the magnetic emissions near the antennas of target wireless devices. To the best of our knowledge, MAG-JAM represents the first solution based on the key observation that the magnetic emissions profile of normal wireless communication between transmitter-receiver pairs is different from the magnetic emissions profile when an active jamming signal starts affecting the communication channel. MAG-JAM has several advantages: its implementation requires mainly an inexpensive magnetic sensor, it is non-invasive and privacy-preserving as it is implemented as a standalone unit, does not need access to the wireless device, and demonstrates a remarkable performance. We design and implement a proof of concept jamming detection system using a cheap magnetic sensor and test MAG-JAM on a set of different wireless devices with a perfect score in jamming detection using no more than 1 s of the magnetic emissions collected by the magnetic sensor under a normalized jamming power of 0.1–1. In addition, we also implement a more advanced jamming detection system using a specialized magnetic probe and autoencoders that, using just 150 ms of collected data, achieves a minimum of 0.91 F1-Score in detecting jamming with a normalized power of 0.2 and an F1-Score of 1 for jamming powers greater than 0.4.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Xu, W., Trappe, W., Zhang, Y., Wood, T.: The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks. In: Proceedings of the 6th ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, pp. 46–57 (2005)
Swinney, C.J., Woods, J.C.: GNSS jamming classification via CNN, transfer learning & the novel concatenation of signal representations. In: 2021 International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and Assessment (CyberSA), pp. 1–9. IEEE (2021)
Alhazbi, S., Sciancalepore, S., Oligeri, G.: Bloodhound: early detection and identification of jamming at the phy-layer. In: IEEE 20th Consumer Communications & Networking Conference (CCNC). IEEE 2023, pp. 1033–1041 (2023)
Sciancalepore, S., Kusters, F., Abdelhadi, N.K., Oligeri, G.: Jamming detection in low-BER mobile indoor scenarios via deep learning. IEEE Internet Things J. (2023)
Jackson, J.D.: Classical electrodynamics (1999)
Instruments, T.: DRV425: Fully-integrated fluxgate magnetic sensor for open-loop applications (2024). https://www.ti.com/tool/DRV425EVM. Accessed 2 Feb 2024
Alhazbi, S., Sciancalepore, S., Oligeri, G.: A dataset of physical-layer measurements in indoor wireless jamming scenarios. Data Brief 46, 108773 (2023)
Saxena, S., Pandey, A., Kumar, S.: RSS based multistage statistical method for attack detection and localization in IoT networks. Pervasive Mob. Comput. 85, 101648 (2022)
Pawlak, J., et al.: A machine learning approach for detecting and classifying jamming attacks against OFDM-based UAVs. In: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Workshop on Wireless Security and Machine Learning, pp. 1–6 (2021)
Li, Y., et al.: Jamming detection and classification in OFDM-based UAVs via feature-and spectrogram-tailored machine learning. IEEE Access 10, 16 859-16 870 (2022)
Liu, D., Raymer, J., Fox, A.: Efficient and timely jamming detection in wireless sensor networks. In: 2012 IEEE 9th International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS 2012), pp. 335–343. IEEE (2012)
Wang, Y., Jere, S., Banerjee, S., Liu, L., Shetty, S., Dayekh, S.: Anonymous jamming detection in 5g with bayesian network model based inference analysis. In: 2022 IEEE 23rd International Conference on High Performance Switching and Routing (HPSR), pp. 151–156. IEEE (2022)
Zhang, Y., Jiu, B., Wang, P., Liu, H., Liang, S.: An end-to-end anti-jamming target detection method based on CNN. IEEE Sensors J. 21(19), 21 817-21 828 (2021)
Lu, K.-D., Wu, Z.-G.: Genetic algorithm-based cumulative sum method for jamming attack detection of cyber-physical power systems. IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas. 71, 1–10 (2022)
O’Shea, T.J., Clancy, T.C., McGwier, R.W.: Recurrent neural radio anomaly detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.00301 (2016)
Rajendran, S., Meert, W., Lenders, V., Pollin, S.: Saife: unsupervised wireless spectrum anomaly detection with interpretable features. In: IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN). IEEE 2018, pp. 1–9 (2018)
Roux, J., Alata, E., Auriol, G., Kaâniche, M., Nicomette, V., Cayre, R.: Radiot: radio communications intrusion detection for IoT-a protocol independent approach. In: IEEE 17th International Symposium on Network Computing and Applications (NCA). IEEE 2018, pp. 1–8 (2018)
Gimenez, P.-F., Roux, J., Alata, E., Auriol, G., Kaâniche, M., Nicomette, V.: Rids: radio intrusion detection and diagnosis system for wireless communications in smart environment. ACM Trans. Cyber-Phys. Syst. 5(3), 1–1 (2021)
Spuhler, M., Giustiniano, D., Lenders, V., Wilhelm, M., Schmitt, J.B.: Detection of reactive jamming in DSSS-based wireless communications. IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 13(3), 1593–1603 (2014)
Strasser, M., Danev, B., Čapkun, S.: Detection of reactive jamming in sensor networks. ACM Trans. Sens. Networks (TOSN) 7(2), 1–29 (2010)
Sufyan, N., Saqib, N.A., Zia, M.: Detection of jamming attacks in 802.11 b wireless networks. EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Netw. 2013, 1–18 (2013)
Maia, H.T., Xiao, C., Li, D., Grinspun, E., Zheng, C.: Can one hear the shape of a neural network?: Snooping the GPU via magnetic side channel. arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.07395 (2021)
Xiao, R., Li, T., Ramesh, S., Han, J., Han, J.: Magtracer: detecting GPU cryptojacking attacks via magnetic leakage signals. In: Proceedings of the 29th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pp. 1–15 (2023)
Liu, Z., et al.: CamRadar: hidden camera detection leveraging amplitude-modulated sensor images embedded in electromagnetic emanations. In: Proceedings of the ACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 1–25 (2023)
Ramesh, S., Hadi, G.S., Yang, S., Chan, M.C., Han, J.: Ticktock: detecting microphone status in laptops leveraging electromagnetic leakage of clock signals. In: Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 2475–2489 (2022)
Ibrahim, O.A., Sciancalepore, S., Oligeri, G., Di Pietro, R.: Magneto: fingerprinting USB flash drives via unintentional magnetic emissions. ACM Trans. Embedded Comput. Syst. (ACM TECS) 20(1), 1–26 (2020)
Cheng, Y., Ji, X., Zhang, J., Xu, W., Chen, Y.-C.: DemiCPU: device fingerprinting with magnetic signals radiated by CPU. In: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 1149–1170 (2019)
Ibrahim, O.A., Sciancalepore, S., Di Pietro, R.: MAG-PUF: magnetic physical unclonable functions for device authentication in the IoT. In: Li, F., Liang, K., Lin, Z., Katsikas, S.K. (eds.) SecureComm 2022. LNCS, vol. 462, pp. 130–149. Springer, Cham (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25538-0_8
Ibrahim, O.A., Sciancalepore, S., Di Pietro, R.: MAG-PUFs: authenticating IoT devices via electromagnetic physical unclonable functions and deep learning. Comput. Secur. 103905 (2024)
Ibrahim, O.A., Di Pietro, R.: MAG-AUTH: authenticating wireless transmitters and receivers on the receiver side via magnetic emissions. In: Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks, pp. 305–316 (2023)
He, J., Guo, X., Ma, H., Liu, Y., Zhao, Y., Jin, Y.: Runtime trust evaluation and hardware trojan detection using on-chip EM sensors. In: 57th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC). IEEE 2020, pp. 1–6 (2020)
Chaman, A., Wang, J., Sun, J., Hassanieh, H., Roy Choudhury, R.: Ghostbuster: detecting the presence of hidden eavesdroppers. In: Proceedings of the 24th Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, pp. 337–351 (2018)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Appendix A
Appendix A
A.1 Different Jamming Signals
We test the performance of MAG-JAM on jammers that employ different types of jamming signals, namely Gaussian and Uniform. Recall that in all of our previous experiments, we used a jammer with Gaussian noise signals. For the Uniform noise jamming depicted in Fig. 9a we analyze the magnetic emissions from a USRP transmitter-receiver pair under six distinct scenarios. Initially, the pair is observed in a normal communication state without any active jammer. After that, we introduce jamming with a uniform noise signal at varying powers ranging from 0.2 to 1, in steps of 0.2, with each scenario separated by black lines.
We observe that the trends in magnetic emissions intensity with increasing jamming powers in the uniform noise scenario are similar to those seen with Gaussian noise jamming, as shown in Fig. 6a. Furthermore, Fig. 9b presents the performance of the autoencoders when trained on normal no-jamming samples and tested with samples collected under jamming with uniform signals. Notably, the performance achieved in this uniform jamming scenario is comparable to that obtained in the Gaussian jamming scenario.
A.2 MAG-JAM Robustness
To ascertain that MAG-JAM is not biased towards any particular jammer, target device, or time frame, we conduct comprehensive testing of its jamming detection capabilities across identical devices at varied time instances, using different jammers and target devices. This involved testing MAG-JAM with two distinct USRP jammers targeting six separate USRP devices. The methodology entailed training the autoencoders with data traces obtained from the first USRP jammer targeting a USRP transmitter-receiver pair. Subsequently, we employed the trained model for testing with the second jammer, which was set to target a second transmitter communicating with three other identical USRP receiver devices. These tests were conducted with jamming powers of 0.6, 0.8, and 1, with each power level being recorded independently. The results, depicted in Fig. 10, demonstrate the proficiency of the autoencoder, initially trained on data from the first USRP jammer and target pair, in distinctly identifying jamming activities from the second USRP jammer on subsequent USRP transmitter-receiver pairs (labeled 2, 3, and 4).
A.3 MAG-JAM Jamming Detection in a Crowded Environment
We also investigate the impact of environmental factors on magnetic emissions by placing a USRP transmitter-receiver pair in a crowded area, with people constantly moving in the path between the transmitter and receiver. We can see a noticeable difference in the observed magnetic emissions depicted in Fig. 11a compared to Fig. 6a that is recorded in a lab environment with minimal movements. However, as demonstrated in Fig. 11b, our autoencoder-based solution can detect the presence of jamming activity even in these crowded environments. We can notice various jamming powers are less distinct than in the controlled lab settings with fewer movements, as shown in Fig. 7. This reduced clarity is attributed to the fact that excessive movements around the wireless devices introduce additional fluctuations into each magnetic emissions sample, resulting in a less stable spectrum than that observed in quieter environments.
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ibrahim, O.A., Di Pietro, R. (2024). MAG-JAM: Jamming Detection via Magnetic Emissions. In: Garcia-Alfaro, J., Kozik, R., Choraś, M., Katsikas, S. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2024. ESORICS 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14982. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70879-4_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-70879-4_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-70878-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-70879-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)