Shifting Our Knowledge of MQ-Sign Security

Abstract

Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) is one of the oldest, simplest, and most studied ad-hoc multivariate signature schemes. UOV signature schemes are attractive because they have very small signatures and fast verification. On the downside, they have large public and secret keys. As a result, variations of the traditional UOV scheme are usually developed with the goal to reduce the key sizes. Seven variants of UOV were submitted to the additional call for digital signatures by NIST, prior to which, a variant named MQ-Sign was submitted to the (South) Korean post-quantum cryptography competition (KpqC). MQ-Sign is currently competing in the second round of KpqC with two variants. One of the variants corresponds to the classic description of UOV with certain implementation and parameter choices. In the other variant, called MQ-Sign-LR, a part of the central map is constructed from row shifts of a single matrix. This design makes for smaller secret keys, and in the case where the equivalent keys optimization is used, it also leads to smaller public keys. However, we show in this work that the polynomial systems arising from an algebraic attack have a specific structure that can be exploited. Specifically, we are able to find preimages for d-periodic targets under the public map with a probability of $63\%$ for all security levels. The complexity of finding these preimages, as well as the fraction of d-periodic target increases with d and hence provides a trade-off. We show that for all security levels one can choose $d=\frac{v}{2}$, for v the number of vinegar variables, and reduce the security claim. Our experiments show practical running times for lower d ranging from 6 s to 14 h.

This research has been supported by the Dutch government through the NWO grant OCNW.M.21.193 (ALPaQCa).