Abstract
This paper concerns the cartel with payment of monetary compensation, studies the cartel members’ bidding strategies in the pre-auction under the first-price and second-price collusion mechanism. It is found that the cartel members report price below its valuation in the first-price collusion mechanism, the cartel members’ offer price is higher than its valuation in the second price collusion mechanism. Furthermore, study the first-price and second-price collusion mechanism’s efficiency when the numbers of cartel members is less than and equal to the total numbers of bidders.
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Jing, H. (2014). The Study on the Collusion Mechanism of Auction and It’s Efficiency. In: Swiątek, J., Grzech, A., Swiątek, P., Tomczak, J. (eds) Advances in Systems Science. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 240. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01857-7_60
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01857-7_60
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-01856-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-01857-7
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