Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Measurement Problem Is Your Problem Too

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
New Directions in the Philosophy of Science

Part of the book series: The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective ((PSEP,volume 5))

  • 1715 Accesses

Abstract

Ontic structural realists draw support for their view from fundamental theories in modern physics. Quantum mechanics is uncontroversially regarded as being amongst those theories. In this paper, I defend the idea that quantum mechanics cannot play this role of a fundamental theory without assuming that a solution for the measurement problem is available. I go on to illustrate that, in the light of possible solutions to the measurement problem, the support for ontic structural realism from quantum mechanics becomes disputable. I also argue that resorting to notions of fundamentality that leave the support for ontic structural realism intact presuppose too much aspects of this metaphysical position for the support from quantum mechanics to be considered significant.

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery cf. Hájek (2007).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 219.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 279.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 279.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Lam and Esfeld (2012) and references therein.

  2. 2.

    Cf. Ladyman (1998), French and Ladyman (2003), Ladyman and Ross (2007), and Muller (2011).

  3. 3.

    Cf. Saunders (2006), Dieks and Versteegh (2008), Muller and Saunders (2008), Muller and Seevinck (2009), and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011).

  4. 4.

    The use of the term “underdetermination” in this context is somewhat controversial in philosophy of science. On the other hand, it is also commonplace within the present topic. For a defense of the use of this term I refer to the authority of Fraassen (1991, p. 481): “The phenomena underdetermine the theory. There are in principle alternative developments of science, branching off from ours at every point in history with equal adequacy as models of the phenomena. Only angels could know these alternative sciences, though sometimes we dimly perceive their possibility. The theory in turn underdetermines the interpretation. Each scientific theory, caught in the amber at one definite historical stage of development and formalization, admits many different tenable interpretations. What is the world depicted by science? That is exactly the question we answer with an interpretation and the answer is not unique.”

  5. 5.

    Cf., Muller and Saunders (2008), Muller and Seevinck (2009), and Caulton (2013).

  6. 6.

    The term “hidden variables” has some unfortunate connotations. First of all, the additional variables may be empirically accessible. In fact, in Bohmian mechanics the positions are the variables whose values are revealed by measurements (see also the defense of Bohmian mechanics given by Bell 1982). What is intended here, however, is the question of whether a hidden-variables approach should be entirely empirically equivalent to orthodox QM. And in this sense the additional variables need not stay hidden as well.

  7. 7.

    For one, it requires an explication of measurement processes and their outcomes as physical processes. A requirement strongly advocated by Bell (1990).

  8. 8.

    I took this idea from Timpson (2008, p. 590) who posed it as part of a possible defense for Quantum Bayesianism.

References

  • Bell, John S. 1982. On the impossible pilot wave. Foundations of Physics 12(10): 989–999. Reprinted in Bell 1987.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, John S. 1987. Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bell, John S. 1990. Against ‘measurement’. Physics World 3: 33–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, Max. 1952. The identity of indiscernibles. Mind 61(242): 153–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bohr, Niels. 1948. On the notions of causality and complementarity. Dialectica 2(3–4): 312–319.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caulton, Adam. 2013. Discerning “indistinguishable” quantum systems. Philosophy of Science 80(1): 49–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dieks, Dennis, and Andrea Lubberdink. 2011. How classical particles emerge from the quantum world. Foundations of Physics 41: 1051–1064.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dieks, Dennis, and Marijn A. M. Versteegh. 2008. Identical quantum particles and weak discernibility. Foundations of Physics 38: 923–934.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven. 1999. Models and mathematics in physics: The role of group theory. In From physics to philosophy, ed. J. Butterfield and C. Pagonis, 187–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, Steven, and James Ladyman. 2003. Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure. Synthese 136(1): 31–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hájek, Alan. 2007. The reference class problem is your problem too. Synthese 156: 563–585.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 1998. What is structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29(3): 409–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James. 2009. Structural Realism. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ladyman, James, and Don Ross. 2007. Every thing must go. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lam, Vincent, and Michael Esfeld. 2012. The structural metaphysics of quantum theory and general relativity. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42(2): 243–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMullin, Ernan. 1984. A case for scientific realism. In Scientific realism, ed. by Jarrett Leplin, 8–40. Berkely: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morganti, Matteo. 2004. On the preferability of epistemic structural realism. Synthese 142: 81–107.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muller, F.A. 2011. Withering away, weakly. Synthese 180: 223–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muller, F.A., and Simon Saunders. 2008. Discerning fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 499–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muller, F.A., and M.P. Seevinck. 2009. Discerning elementary particles. Philosophy of Science 76(2): 179–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saunders, Simon. 2006. Are quantum particles objects? Analysis 66(1): 52–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Timpson, Christopher Gordon. 2008. Quantum bayesianism: A study. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39: 579–609.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Valentini, Antony. 2010. Inflationary cosmology as a probe of primordial quantum mechanics. Physical Review D 82(6): 063513(1–22).

    Google Scholar 

  • van Fraassen, Bas (1991). Quantum mechanics: An empiricist view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Worall, John. 1989. Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica 34(1–2): 99–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the following people for constructive comments and discussions: D. Dieks, F.A. Muller, J.W. Romeijn, M.P. Seevinck, and two anonymous referees. This work was supported by the NWO (Vidi project nr. 016.114.354).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Ronnie Hermens

Authors
  1. Ronnie Hermens
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ronnie Hermens .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Commmunication, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

    Maria Carla Galavotti

  2. Institute for History and Foundations of Science, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Dennis Dieks

  3. Faculty of Humanities, University of A Coruña, Ferrol, Spain

    Wenceslao J. Gonzalez

  4. Centre for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Stephan Hartmann

  5. School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom

    Thomas Uebel

  6. Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva 4, Switzerland

    Marcel Weber

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hermens, R. (2014). The Measurement Problem Is Your Problem Too. In: Galavotti, M., Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Uebel, T., Weber, M. (eds) New Directions in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04382-1_32

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation