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Network Iron Curtain: Hide Enterprise Networks with OpenFlow

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Book cover Information Security Applications (WISA 2013)

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Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new network architecture, Network Iron Curtain that can handle network scanning attacks automatically. Network Iron Curtain does not require additional devices or complicated configurations when it detects scanning attack, and it can confuse scanning attackers by providing fake scanning results. When an attacker sends a scanning packet to a host in Network Iron Curtain, Network Iron Curtain detects this trial and redirects this packet to a honeynet, which is installed with Network Iron Curtain. The honeynet will respond to this scanning packet based on the predefined policy instead of the original target host. Therefore, the attacker will have fake information (i.e., false open port information). We implement a prototype system to verify the proposed architecture, and we show an example case of detecting network scanning.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We provide more information about OpenFlow in the next section.

  2. 2.

    We consider that the packet is corrupted if it does not follow the network protocol standard. For example, if a TCP session is initiated by a TCP RST packet, then we regard that the RST packet is corrupted.

  3. 3.

    This timer will be used to detect TCP SYN scanning trials. We will show how the controller uses this timer in the following case.

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Correspondence to YongJoo Song .

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Song, Y., Shin, S., Choi, Y. (2014). Network Iron Curtain: Hide Enterprise Networks with OpenFlow. In: Kim, Y., Lee, H., Perrig, A. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8267. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05149-9_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05149-9_14

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-05148-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-05149-9

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