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Computational Soundness of Symbolic Blind Signatures under Active Attacker

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Foundations and Practice of Security (FPS 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8352))

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Abstract

Blind signature schemes enable users to obtain signatures on texts without revealing the texts to signers. They are often used to provide anonymity in protocols such as electronic cash and voting protocols. To confirm the security of such a voting scheme, Kremer and Ryan employ a symbolic model for protocols that use blind signatures. However, the soundness of this model with respect to the computational model in which security of blind signatures is defined is yet to be explored. In this paper, we discuss certain difficulties involved in establishing the computational soundness of their symbolic model, propose an alternative symbolic model, and show its computational soundness.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Communication Science Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Kanagawa, Japan

    Hideki Sakurada

Authors
  1. Hideki Sakurada
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Correspondence to Hideki Sakurada .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Commun. & Electronique, Télécom ParisTech, Paris, France

    Jean Luc Danger

  2. Concordia Institute for Information Syst Concordia University Research Chair Tier, Concordia University, Montreal, Québec, Canada

    Mourad Debbabi

  3. École des Mines, Nancy, France

    Jean-Yves Marion

  4. RST Department, Rm A105-2, Télécom SudParis, Evry, France

    Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro

  5. Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada

    Nur Zincir Heywood

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Sakurada, H. (2014). Computational Soundness of Symbolic Blind Signatures under Active Attacker. In: Danger, J., Debbabi, M., Marion, JY., Garcia-Alfaro, J., Zincir Heywood, N. (eds) Foundations and Practice of Security. FPS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8352. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05302-8_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05302-8_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-05301-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-05302-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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