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A Methodology for Hook-Based Kernel Level Rootkits

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8434))

Abstract

It is easy to discover if there are hooks in the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT). However, it is difficult to tell whether theses hooks are malicious or not after finding out the hooks in the SSDT. In this paper, we propose a scheme that evaluates the hooks by comparing the returned results before hooking and after hooking. If a malicious hook which hides itself by the way of modifying the parameters passed to the Native API, we can easily detect the difference. Furthermore, we use a runtime detour patching technique so that it will not perturb the normal operation of user-mode programs. Finally, we focus on the existing approaches of rootkits detection in both user-mode and kernel-mode. Our method effectively monitors the behavior of hooks and brings an accurate view point for users to examine their computers.

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Chen, CM., Wu, ME., He, BZ., Zheng, X., Hsing, C., Sun, HM. (2014). A Methodology for Hook-Based Kernel Level Rootkits. In: Huang, X., Zhou, J. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8434. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06320-1_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06319-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06320-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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