Skip to main content

Query Log Attack on Encrypted Databases

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Secure Data Management (SDM 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8425))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1600 Accesses

Abstract

Encrypting data at rest has been one of the most common ways to protect the database data against honest but curious adversaries. In the literature there are more than a dozen mechanisms proposed on how to encrypt data to achieve different levels of confidentiality. However, a database system is more than just data. An inseparable aspect of a database system is its interaction with the users through queries. Yet, a query-enhanced adversary model that captures the security of user interactions with the encrypted database is missing. In this paper, we will first revisit a few well-known adversary models on the data encryption schemes. Also, to model the query-enhanced adversaries we additionally need new tools, which will be formally defined. Eventually, this paper introduces query-enhanced adversary models which additionally have access to the query logs or interact with the database in different ways. We will prove by reduction that breaking a cryptosystem by a query-enhanced adversary is at least as difficult as breaking the cryptosystem by a common adversary.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    An Experiment is also called a Game in some security literatures.

  2. 2.

    An Adversary is also called a Winner in some security literatures.

  3. 3.

    Polynomial-time in the size of the input.

  4. 4.

    Safe means indistinguishable in this experiment.

References

  1. Agrawal, R., Kiernan, J., Srikant, R., Xu, Y.: Order preserving encryption for numeric data. In: SIGMOD, pp. 563–574 (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Arasu, A., Blanas, S.: Orthogonal security with cipherbase. In: CIDR (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Bajaj, S., Sion, R.: TrustedDB: a trusted hardware based database with privacy and data confidentiality. In: SIGMOD, pp. 205–216 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Boldyreva, A., Chenette, N., Lee, Y., O’Neill, A.: Order-preserving symmetric encryption. In: Joux, A. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5479, pp. 224–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Boldyreva, A., Chenette, N., O’Neill, A.: Order-preserving encryption revisited: improved security analysis and alternative solutions. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 578–595. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Damiani, E., De Capitani Vimercati, S., Jajodia, S., Paraboschi, S., Samarati, P.: Balancing confidentiality and efficiency in untrusted relational DBMSs. In: CCS, pp. 93–102 (2003)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Hacigümüş, H., Iyer, B., Li, C., Mehrotra, S.: Executing SQL over encrypted data in the database-service-provider model. In: SIGMOD, pp. 216–227 (2002)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Hildenbrand, S., Kossmann, D., Sanamrad, T., Binnig, C., Faerber, F., Woehler, J.: Query processing on encrypted data in the cloud. Technical report 735, Department of Computer Science, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Introduction to Modern Cryptography. CRC Press, Boca Raton (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Popa, R., Redfield, C., Zeldovich, N., Balakrishnan, H.: CryptDB: protecting confidentiality with encrypted query processing. In: SOSP, pp. 85–100 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Rivest, R., Adleman, L., Dertouzos, M.: On data banks and privacy homomorphisms. In: DeMillo, R.A., et al. (eds.) Foundations of Secure Computation, pp. 169–178. Academic Press, New York (1978)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Sanamrad, T., Braun, L., Kossmann, D., Ramarathnam, V.: POP: a new encryption scheme for dynamic databases. Technical report 782, Department of Computer Science, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Sion, R.: Secure data outsourcing. In: VLDB, pp. 1431–1432 (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Tu, S., Kaashoek, M., Madden, S., Zeldovich, N.: Processing analytical queries over encrypted data. In: VLDB, pp. 289–300 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tahmineh Sanamrad .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Sanamrad, T., Kossmann, D. (2014). Query Log Attack on Encrypted Databases. In: Jonker, W., Petković, M. (eds) Secure Data Management. SDM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8425. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06811-4_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06811-4_14

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-06810-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-06811-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics