Abstract
Nowadays, competitions between supply chains forces members to participate in strategic partnerships extending the isolated firm’s competitive advantages. Contracting and in particular revenue sharing contract is one of the main applicable partnership mechanisms being dramatically analyzed in the literature for coordinating two-echelon supply chains. However there exist a handful of studies based on multi-echelon supply chains. Reviewing the literature, revenue sharing contracts can be developed through two approaches in multi-echelon supply chains: spanning and pair-wise schemes. In this research we review first, the last developments in telecom industries providing a new model for telecom supply chains, then we model different revenue sharing contracts in order to coordinate a three-echelon telecom supply chain facing demand uncertainty. Finally we compare the strengths and limitations for implementing different pair-wise and spanning revenue sharing contracts in telecom industries which can be helpful for both academics and practitioners.
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Yeganehfallah, A., Mashreghi, H., Amin-Naseri, M.R. (2014). Coordinating a Three-Echelon Telecom Supply Chain with Spanning and Pair-Wise Revenue Sharing Contracts. In: Huisman, D., Louwerse, I., Wagelmans, A. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2013. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_67
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-07001-8_67
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