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Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy

ACISP 2014: Information Security and Privacy pp 66–81Cite as

Strongly Simulation-Extractable Leakage-Resilient NIZK

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8544))

Abstract

This paper defines strongly simulation-extractable leakage-resiliency (sSE-LR), which is a new notion for NIZK proof system. Our definition extends the weaker notion called true simulation-extractable leakage-resiliency (tSE-LR) defined by Garg, Jain, and Sahai in CRYPTO 2011. Moreover, improving the construction of tSE-LR-NIZK proof system by Garg et al., we construct an NIZK scheme that satisfies sSE-LR. An sSE-LR-NIZK proof system is applicable to construct a fully leakage resilient signature scheme which is strongly existentially unforgeable. As far as we know, this is the first fully leakage resilient signature scheme that is strongly existentially unforgeable.

Department of Mathematical and Computing Sciences, Graduate School of Information Science and Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, W8-55, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Meguro-ku, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. Supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) No.24240001 and (C) No.23500010, a grant of I-System Co. Ltd., and NTT Secure Platform Laboratories.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

    Yuyu Wang & Keisuke Tanaka

Authors
  1. Yuyu Wang
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  2. Keisuke Tanaka
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Willy Susilo  & Yi Mu  & 

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Wang, Y., Tanaka, K. (2014). Strongly Simulation-Extractable Leakage-Resilient NIZK. In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8544. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08344-5_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-08343-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-08344-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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