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Vulnerability evaluation of multiplexing PUF for SVM attacks

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Progress in Systems Engineering

Part of the book series: Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing ((AISC,volume 366))

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Abstract

Recently, semiconductor counterfeiting has become serious problems due to the advancement of reverse engineering technologies. The physical unclonable function (PUF) is now attracting attention as a technique to prevent counterfeiting. The PUF utilizes each device's analog characteristics, which are generated by variations on LSI manufacturing, as a measure for individual identification. However, the vulnerability of PUF to machine learning attacks has been pointed out. Therefore, it is important to examine the vulnerability of PUF from a view point of hardware security. This paper discusses the vulnerability of the proposed 4-MUXs PUF for attack using support vector machine (SVM). Experiments show superior resistance for SVM attacks in comparison with conventional PUF.

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References

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Acknowledgment

This research was supported by Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), Core Research for Evolutional Science and Technology (CREST).

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Correspondence to S. Kiryu .

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© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Kiryu, S., Asahi, K., Yoshikawa, M. (2015). Vulnerability evaluation of multiplexing PUF for SVM attacks. In: Selvaraj, H., Zydek, D., Chmaj, G. (eds) Progress in Systems Engineering. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 366. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08422-0_31

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08422-0_31

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-08421-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-08422-0

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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