Abstract
We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer et al. [14]. In such a framework, given a real matrix Γ = (γ ij ) specifying a particular social context, each player i aims at optimizing a linear combination of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player j, the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value γ ij . We give a broad characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the literature.
This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2010–2011 research project ARS TechnoMedia: “Algorithmics for Social Technological Networks” funded by the Italian Ministry of University.
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Bilò, V. (2014). On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context. In: Cai, Z., Zelikovsky, A., Bourgeois, A. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8591. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08783-2_47
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08783-2_47
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