Abstract
In this paper, we formally derive the probabilistic security predicate (expectation) for a guessing attack against a system with side-channel leakage, modelled in pGCL. Our principal theoretical contribution is to link the process-oriented view, where attacker and system execute particular model programs, and the information-theoretic view, where the attacker solves an optimal-decoding problem, viewing the system as a noisy channel. Our practical contribution is to illustrate the selection of probabilistic loop invariants to verify such security properties, and the demonstration of a mechanical proof linking traditionally distinct domains.
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Cock, D. (2014). From Operational Models to Information Theory; Side Channels in pGCL with Isabelle. In: Klein, G., Gamboa, R. (eds) Interactive Theorem Proving. ITP 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8558. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08970-6_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08970-6_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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