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Using the Joint Distributions of a Cryptographic Function in Side Channel Analysis

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Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design (COSADE 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8622))

Abstract

The Side Channel Analysis is now a classic way to retrieve a secret key in the smart-card world. Unfortunately, most of the ensuing attacks require the plaintext or the ciphertext used by the embedded algorithm. In this article, we present a new method for exploiting the leakage of a device without this constraint. Our attack is based on a study of the leakage distribution of internal data of a cryptographic function and can be performed not only at the beginning or the end of the algorithm, but also at every instant that involves the secret key. This paper focuses on the distribution study and the resulting attack. We also propose a way to proceed in a noisy context using smart distances. We validate our proposition by practical results on an AES128 software implemented on a ATMega2561 and on the DPAContest v4 [32].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This property is true for most cryptographic functions like DES S-boxes or AES SubBytes.

  2. 2.

    An erroneous sample is obtained by adding a white noise to the true value.

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Victor Lomné for providing us traces and suggestions. We are also grateful to Thomas Roche and Christophe Giraud for their reviews and helpful comments.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CEA-LETI/MINATEC, 17 Rue des Martyrs, 38054, Grenoble Cedex 9, France

    Yanis Linge & Cécile Dumas

  2. UJF-Grenoble 1/CNRS/UPMF/TIMC-IMAG UMR 5525, 38041, Grenoble, France

    Yanis Linge & Sophie Lambert-Lacroix

Authors
  1. Yanis Linge
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  2. Cécile Dumas
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  3. Sophie Lambert-Lacroix
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Correspondence to Yanis Linge .

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  1. FNISA, Paris, France

    Emmanuel Prouff

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Linge, Y., Dumas, C., Lambert-Lacroix, S. (2014). Using the Joint Distributions of a Cryptographic Function in Side Channel Analysis. In: Prouff, E. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8622. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10175-0_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10175-0_14

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