Abstract
Lightweight cryptography and efficient implementations, including efficient countermeasures against side-channel analysis, are of great importance for embedded devices, and, consequently, a lot of progress has been done in this area in recent years. In 2012, the RSM masking scheme [15] was introduced as an efficient countermeasure against side-channel attacks on AES. RSM has no time penalty, only reasonable area overhead, uses only 4 bit of entropy, and is deemed to be secure against univariate first- and second-order attacks. In this paper we first review the original practical security evaluation and discuss some shortcomings. We then reveal a weakness in the set of masks used in RSM, i.e., we found that certain pairs of masks have a constant difference. This weakness is subsequently exploited to mount five different side-channel attacks against RSM: a univariate first-order CPA enabled by simple pre-processing and a variant of a first-order correlation-enhanced collision attack, both on a smart card implementation, and a univariate second-order CPA as well as two first- and second-order collision attacks against an FPGA implementation. All five attacks show how such a vulnerability in the mask set can undermine the security of the scheme and therefore highlight the importance of carefully choosing the masks.
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Notes
- 1.
All operations are \(\%16\).
- 2.
We would like to thank the authors for providing the implementation.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Thomas Peyrin and Ivica Nikolic for the fruitful discussions and Marc Stöttinger for the pointer to the k-means algorithm. We would also like to thank the reviewers for their valuable comments which greatly helped to improve this paper.
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Kutzner, S., Poschmann, A. (2014). On the Security of RSM - Presenting 5 First- and Second-Order Attacks. In: Prouff, E. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8622. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10175-0_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10175-0_20
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