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Using Principal Component Analysis for Practical Biasing of Power Traces to Improve Power Analysis Attacks

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Information Security and Cryptology -- ICISC 2013 (ICISC 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8565))

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Abstract

Researchers have focused significant attention on side-channel attacks since the first power analysis attack was introduced. To date, several ideas have been introduced to efficiently analyze cryptographic modules. A power trace selection method for improving attack efficiency was recently presented; however, applying it involves many restrictions. Therefore, we propose a new selection method to improve power analysis attacks using principal component analysis. Our method is a practical one for biasing power traces. Our experimental results show that the proposed method improves attack efficiency in terms of the number of traces used for finding the secret key.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Originally, the number of entire provided traces was 80,000. However, we downloaded 30,000 traces out of it for computational and storage space reasons.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Attached Institute of Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute, P.O.Box 1, Yuseong, Daejeon, 305-600, Korea

    Yongdae Kim & Haengseok Ko

Authors
  1. Yongdae Kim
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  2. Haengseok Ko
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Correspondence to Yongdae Kim .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. EWHA Womans University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Hyang-Sook Lee

  2. Kookmin University, Seoul, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Dong-Guk Han

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Kim, Y., Ko, H. (2014). Using Principal Component Analysis for Practical Biasing of Power Traces to Improve Power Analysis Attacks. In: Lee, HS., Han, DG. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology -- ICISC 2013. ICISC 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8565. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12160-4_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12160-4_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12159-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12160-4

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