Abstract
The notion of forward-secure sequential aggregate message authentication was introduced by Ma and Tsudik in 2007. It is suitable for applications such as audit logging systems and wireless sensor networks. Ma and Tsudik also constructed a scheme with a MAC function and a collision resistant hash function. However, the notion has not been fully formalized and the security of the scheme has not been confirmed. In this paper, forward-secure sequential aggregate message authentication schemes and their security are formalized. Then, a generic construction with a MAC function and a pseudorandom generator is presented. It is also shown that the construction is secure if the underlying primitives are secure.
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Hirose, S., Kuwakado, H. (2014). Forward-Secure Sequential Aggregate Message Authentication Revisited. In: Chow, S.S.M., Liu, J.K., Hui, L.C.K., Yiu, S.M. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8782. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12475-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
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