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Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary Report)

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Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8840))

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Abstract

We investigate an adaptive cyber-defense scenario, where an attacker’s ability to compromise a targeted server increases progressively with probing, and the defender can erase attacker progress through a moving-target technique. The environment includes multiple resources, interdependent preferences, and asymmetric stealth. By combining systematic simulation over a strategy space with game-theoretic analysis, we identify equilibria for six versions of this environment. The results show how strategic outcomes vary qualitatively with environment conditions, and demonstrate the value of reliable probe detection in setting up an effective deterrent to attack.

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Wellman, M.P., Prakash, A. (2014). Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario (Preliminary Report). In: Poovendran, R., Saad, W. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8840. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12600-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12601-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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