Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols

  • Conference paper
Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8840))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

In this work, we describe how to realize rational cryptographic protocols in practice from abstract game specifications. Existing work requires strong assumptions about communication resources in order to preserve equilibria between game descriptions and realized protocols. We argue that for real world protocols, it must be assumed that players have access to point-to-point communication channels. Thus, allowing signaling and strategy correlation becomes unavoidable. We argue that ideal world game descriptions of realizable protocols should include such communication resources as well, in order to facilitate the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm.

The rights of this work are transferred to the extent transferable according to title 17 §105 U.S.C.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game. In: STOC 1987: Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 218–229. ACM, New York (1987)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In: 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2005, pp. 585–594 (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Alwen, J., Shelat, A., Visconti, I.: Collusion-free protocols in the mediated model. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 497–514. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Alwen, J., Katz, J., Lindell, Y., Persiano, G., Shelat, A., Visconti, I.: Collusion-free multiparty computation in the mediated model. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 524–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Lepinksi, M., Micali, S., Shelat, A.: Collusion-free protocols. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Seventh Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2005, pp. 543–552. ACM, New York (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Alwen, J., Katz, J., Maurer, U., Zikas, V.: Collusion-preserving computation. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 124–143. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Kamara, S., Mohassel, P., Raykova, M.: Outsourcing multi-party computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/272 (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/

  8. Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Naccache, D.: Efficient rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 419–436. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  9. Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: Extended abstract. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2004, pp. 623–632. ACM, New York (2004)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and adversarial behavior in multi-party computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Canetti, R., Vald, M.: Universally composable security with local adversaries. In: Visconti, I., De Prisco, R. (eds.) SCN 2012. LNCS, vol. 7485, pp. 281–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  12. Nielsen, J.B., Alwen, J., Cachin, C., Nielsen, J.B., Pereira, O.: Summary report on rational cryptographic protocols (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Poundstone, W.: Prisoner’s Dilemma: John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb, 1st edn. Doubleday, New York (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Wallrabenstein, J.R., Clifton, C.: Privacy preserving tatonnement: A cryptographic construction of an incentive compatible market. In: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. LNCS. Springer, Heidelberg (2014)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational secret sharing, revisited. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2006/142 (2006), http://eprint.iacr.org/

  16. Micali, S., Shelat, A.: Purely rational secret sharing (extended abstract). In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 54–71. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  17. Groce, A., Katz, J., Thiruvengadam, A., Zikas, V.: Byzantine agreement with a rational adversary. In: Czumaj, A., Mehlhorn, K., Pitts, A., Wattenhofer, R. (eds.) ICALP 2012, Part II. LNCS, vol. 7392, pp. 561–572. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Groce, A., Katz, J.: Fair computation with rational players. In: Pointcheval, D., Johansson, T. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2012. LNCS, vol. 7237, pp. 81–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  19. Zhang, Z., Liu, M.: Rational secret sharing as extensive games. Science China Information Sciences 56, 1–13 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Maleka, S., Shareef, A., Rangan, C.P.: Rational secret sharing with repeated games. In: Chen, L., Mu, Y., Susilo, W. (eds.) ISPEC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4991, pp. 334–346. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  22. Nojoumian, M., Stinson, D.R.: Socio-rational secret sharing as a new direction in rational cryptography. In: Grossklags, J., Walrand, J. (eds.) GameSec 2012. LNCS, vol. 7638, pp. 18–37. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  23. Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for exchanging information. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2008, pp. 423–432. ACM, New York (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  24. Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Zhang, Z., Liu, M.: Unconditionally secure rational secret sharing in standard communication networks. In: Rhee, K.-H., Nyang, D. (eds.) ICISC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6829, pp. 355–369. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  26. Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 1991, pp. 51–59. ACM, New York (1991)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  27. Katz, J.: Bridging game theory and cryptography: Recent results and future directions. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 251–272. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press Books, vol. 1. MIT Press (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  29. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. MIT Press (August 991)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Asharov, G., Canetti, R., Hazay, C.: Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation. In: Paterson, K.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2011. LNCS, vol. 6632, pp. 426–445. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  31. Dodis, Y., Halevi, S., Rabin, T.: A cryptographic solution to a game theoretic problem. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 112–130. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  32. Miltersen, P.B., Nielsen, J.B., Triandopoulos, N.: Privacy-enhancing auctions using rational cryptography. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 541–558. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  33. Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press (2004)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Computer Science, Purdue University, USA

    John Ross Wallrabenstein & Chris Clifton

Authors
  1. John Ross Wallrabenstein
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Chris Clifton
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical Engineering Department, Network Securitiy Lab, University of Washington, Box 352500, 98195-2055, Seattle, WA, USA

    Radha Poovendran

  2. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Virginia Tech, Whittmore Hall 302, 1185 Perry Street, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA

    Walid Saad

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Wallrabenstein, J.R., Clifton, C. (2014). Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols. In: Poovendran, R., Saad, W. (eds) Decision and Game Theory for Security. GameSec 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8840. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12600-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-12601-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation