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Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8877))

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Abstract

We consider coalitional games played on social networks (graphs), where feasible coalitions are associated with connected subsets of agents. We characterize families of graphs that have polynomially many feasible coalitions, and show that the complexity of computing common solution concepts and parameters of coalitional games on social networks is polynomial in the number of feasible coalitions. Also, we establish a connection between coalitional games on social networks and the synergy coalition group representation [5], and provide new complexity results for this representation. In particular, we identify a variant of this representation where computing the cost of stability [2] is easy, but computing the value of the least core [12] is hard.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oxford, UK

    Edith Elkind

Authors
  1. Edith Elkind
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Haidian District, 100080, Beijing, China

    Tie-Yan Liu

  2. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Qi Qi

  3. Deptartment of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, 94305-4121, Stanford, CA, USA

    Yinyu Ye

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Elkind, E. (2014). Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks. In: Liu, TY., Qi, Q., Ye, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8877. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13128-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13129-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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