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Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games

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Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 8877))

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Abstract

We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed cost functions \(\mathcal{F}\), we provide a threshold value \(\mu(\mathcal{F})\), and show that for the class of social context congestion games with cost functions from \(\mathcal{F}\), α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if and only if \(\alpha>\mu(\mathcal{F})\).

Interestingly, \(\mu(\mathcal{F})\) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’s anarchy value [19].

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Liverpool, U.K.

    Martin Gairing & Grammateia Kotsialou

  2. University of Paderborn, Germany

    Alexander Skopalik

Authors
  1. Martin Gairing
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  2. Grammateia Kotsialou
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  3. Alexander Skopalik
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Haidian District, 100080, Beijing, China

    Tie-Yan Liu

  2. The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Qi Qi

  3. Deptartment of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, 94305-4121, Stanford, CA, USA

    Yinyu Ye

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In: Liu, TY., Qi, Q., Ye, Y. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8877. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13128-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13129-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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