Abstract
In this chapter we explore cyber-counterdeception (cyber-CD), what it is, and how it works, and how to incorporate counterdeception into cyber defenses. We review existing theories and techniques of counterdeception and relate counterdeception to the concepts of cyber attack kill chains and intrusion campaigns. We adapt theories and techniques of counterdeception to the concepts of cyber defenders’ deception chains and deception campaigns. We describe the utility of conducting cyber wargames and exercises to develop the techniques of cyber-denial & deception (cyber-D&D) and cyber-CD. Our goal is to suggest how cyber defenders can use cyber-CD, in conjunction with defensive cyber-D&D campaigns, to detect and counter cyber attackers.
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Notes
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McNair (1991).
- 3.
Whaley (2006) further wrote: “Counterdeception is … now standard jargon among specialists in military deception. This useful term was coined in 1968 by Dr. William R. Harris during a brainstorming session with me in Cambridge, Massachusetts.” Harris’s papers, while widely influencing other scholars of deception and counterdeception, are hard to come by. Epstein (1991) cites Harris (1968). Other relevant Harris counterdeception papers Epstein cited include Harris (1972); and Harris (1985).
- 4.
Boush et al. (2009), inDeception in the Marketplace: The Psychology of Deceptive Persuasion and Consumer Self Protection, advocate “deception protection” for consumers (Chap 1) to help them “detect, neutralize and resist the varied types of deception” in the marketplace.
- 5.
Bodmer et al. (2012) noted Chinese cyber deception in cyber wargaming (p. 82): “reports of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advancing their cyber-deception capabilities through a coordinated computer network attack and electronic warfare integrated exercise.” We found no references explicitly to cyber exercises ofcyber-counterdeception.
- 6.
Rowe used the termcounterdeception, we believe he meant what we term herecounter-deception; Rowe (2004). Rowe (2003) proposed a counterplanning approach to planning and managing what we termcounter-deception operations. A recent description of counter-deception, “a multi-layer deception system that provides an in depth defense against … sophisticated targeted attacks,” is Wang et al. (2013).
- 7.
For a general analysis of denial techniques in cyber-counter-deception (cyber-C-D), see Yuill et al. (2006).
- 8.
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- 9.
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- 10.
Other than a few references to detecting deception in social engineering situations, we found no research on cyber-counterdeception, per se, in general searching of the scholarly literature.
- 11.
Some (e.g., Bennett and Waltz2007) would credit “incongruity analysis” to R. V. Jones, and his theory of spoofing and counter-spoofing. See Jones (2009), pp. 285–291: “the perception of incongruity—which my ponderings have led me to believe is the basic requirement for a sense of humour—[concluding]… the object of a practical joke [is] the creation of an incongruity.”
- 12.
For example, Heuer (1981). Whether or not deception is detected, assessing hypotheses regarding the adversary’s possible courses of action against the evidence provides useful insights into adversary intentions. Heuser (1996) wrote, : “The [counterdeception] cell would be tasked to … [look] at the data from the enemy’s point of view. They would need to place themselves in the mind of the enemy, determine how they would develop a deception plan and see if evidence supports it…. The enemy may not be employing a deception plan, but the process will aid in exploring different enemy courses of action that may have been overlooked.,” Bruce and Bennett (2008) wrote: “the failure to generate hypotheses increases vulnerability to deception…One key to Why Bad Things Happen to Good Analysts has been conflicting organizational signals regarding promotion of overconfidence (“making the call”) versus promotion of more rigorous consideration of alternative hypotheses and the quality of information;” in George and Bruce (2008).
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Although originally referred to as the “Intrusion Kill Chain” by the authors of the related seminal paper, the concept is now more generally referred to as “Cyber Kill Chain.” Seehttp://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/what-we-do/information-technology/cyber-security/cyber-kill-chain.html.
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Croom (2010). The author, Lieutenant General Charles Croom (Ret.) is Vice President of Lockheed Martin Information Systems and Global Solutions.
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See Fischhoff (1982).
- 19.
See Stech and Elsässer (2007).
- 20.
“2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, which is most commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.” Unit 61398 functions as “the Third Department`s premier entity targeting the United States and Canada, most likely focusing on political, economic, and military-related intelligence,” Stokes et al. (2011).
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Some recent wargame examples are described in Alberts et al. (2010). Joint Chiefs of Staff (2006) recommends wargaming plans and courses of action for information operations. Wargaming by DOD may be less frequent than suggested by doctrine and history, e.g., regarding the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia a U.S. Army War College analysis concluded “U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis regarding the Russian threat to Georgia failed. … No scenarios of a Russian invasion were envisaged, wargamed, or seriously exercised;” p. 72, Cohen and Hamilton (2011).
- 23.
Wheaton (2011) recommends a game-based approach to teaching strategic intelligence analysis to increase learning, improve student performance, and increase student satisfaction;.
- 24.
For example, Pérez2004 wrote: “The risks vs. benefits of committing [military rescue] forces must be weighed and war-gamed carefully between all civilian/military leaders prior to committing the military arm [to a hostage rescue mission]. ”
- 25.
Even when wargames are designed to explore future concepts and capabilities, they must provide a realistic basis for these innovations and a realistic environment for the exploration. See, for example, Rosen1991; Murray and Millet1996,2000; Scales and Robert2000; Knox and Murray2001; and Fisher2005.
- 26.
On the other hand, counterdeception analysis can be performed synchronously in live exercises or asynchronously on “cold cases.” That is, an asynchronous counterdeception reconstruction of D&D operations from forensic materials, historical records, and other materials can be readily performed. Such asynchronous analyses are common in counter-fraud, cheating detection, art forgery analysis, malingering, etc. For example, see Stech and Elsässer (2007)
- 27.
Bennett and Waltz (2007) cite the National Intelligence Council’s (2000, p. 9) conclusion regarding the future use of deception: “most adversaries will recognize the information advantage and military superiority of the United States in 2015. Rather than acquiesce to any potential US military domination, they will try to circumvent or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses [though] greater access … to sophisticated deception-and-denial techniques…”
- 28.
See, for example, Bodmer et al. (2012): “There is a very well-developed legal framework to deal with intruders, and as one of the “good guys” your responses are bound by that framework. You can expect to work closely with legal counsel to ensure that your operation is legal… But this does not mean that there are no ethical consequences to your actions. Even if your specific [cyber-D&D] operation does not push ethical boundaries, taken collectively, the actions of you and your colleagues just may.”
- 29.
What Whaley (2007e) found (as might be expected) is subtle: Some cultures are clearly more deceptive than others but only during given slices of time. No single culture has excelled in deceptiveness throughout its history; while the Chinese since the 1940s have shown high levels of military-political deceptiveness, this is not true throughout Chinese history. In a given culture and time, levels of deceptiveness can be quite different across major disciplines of military, domestic politics, foreign diplomacy, and commercial business. Sometimes ends justify means, practical considerations of greed and survival sometimes override religious, moral, or ethical objections to deception. High, medium, and low levels of deceptive behavior were found in every culture at different times and regardless of its level of technology. We found no comparisons of counterdeception capabilities across cultures comparable to Whaley’s analysis of cultural deceptiveness.
- 30.
Not all observers agree with Jones’s and Whaley’s concept of a “counterdeception analyst’s advantage” over deceivers, and some tend to see the deception-counterdeception contest in terms of (to use Handel’s (2005) characterization), “the persistent difficulty involved in attempting to expose deception” i.e., more along the lines of Fig. 6.5, above (Matrix of Attacker’s Denial & Deception Moves versus Defender’s Counterdenial and Counterdeception Moves). For example, Scot Macdonald (2007) sees the deceivers as generally holding the advantages over deception detectives as new tools, technologies, channels, and environments become available.
- 31.
An ad hoc search on “growth of the global cyber security industry” yielded a 2014 estimate of about $77 billion, and a 2019 estimate of about $ 156 billion, i.e., more than doubling in 5 years, or roughly seven times faster growth than estimates of the growth of the global economy over the 2014–2019 time frame. Seehttp://www.asdnews.com/news-53610/Global_Cyber_Security_Market_to_be_Worth_$76.68bn_in_2014.htm; http://www.marketsandmarkets.com/PressReleases/cyber-security.asp; andhttp://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/GEO2014_Methodology.pdf.
- 32.
- 33.
One 2009 report suggested the Chinese will employ integrated network electronic warfare which includes “using techniques such as electronic jamming, electronic deception and suppression to disrupt information acquisition and information transfer, launching a virus attack or hacking to sabotage information processing and information utilization, and using anti-radiation and other weapons based on new mechanisms to destroy enemy information platforms and information facilities.” Krekel (2009).
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Heckman, K., Stech, F. (2015). Cyber Counterdeception: How to Detect Denial & Deception (D&D). In: Jajodia, S., Shakarian, P., Subrahmanian, V., Swarup, V., Wang, C. (eds) Cyber Warfare. Advances in Information Security, vol 56. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14039-1_6
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