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Group Size and Gossip Strategies: An ABM Tool for Investigating Reputation-Based Cooperation

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Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XV (MABS 2014)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9002))

Abstract

In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain cooperation. There are two main paths through which social control can be applied: punishment and reputation. Using a Public Goods Game, we show that gossip, used for assortment under three different strategies, can be effective in large groups, whereas its efficacy is reduced in small groups, with no main effect of the gossiping strategy. We also test four different combinations of gossip and costly punishment, showing that a combination of punishment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The model can be downloaded at http://labss.istc.cnr.it/code/punishment-and- reputation.

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Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge support from PRISMA project, within the Italian National Program for Research and Innovation (Programma Operativo Nazionale Ricerca e Competitivitá 2007–2013. Settore: Smart Cities and Communities and Social Innovation Asse e Obiettivo: Asse II - Azioni integrate per lo sviluppo sostenibile).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. ISTC-CNR, Roma, Italy

    Francesca Giardini, Mario Paolucci & Rosaria Conte

  2. Universidade Federal Do Rio Grande - FURG, Rio Grande, Brazil

    Diana Adamatti

Authors
  1. Francesca Giardini
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  2. Mario Paolucci
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  3. Diana Adamatti
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  4. Rosaria Conte
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mario Paolucci .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Universitat de València, Burjassot-València, Spain

    Francisco Grimaldo

  2. Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, United Kingdom

    Emma Norling

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Giardini, F., Paolucci, M., Adamatti, D., Conte, R. (2015). Group Size and Gossip Strategies: An ABM Tool for Investigating Reputation-Based Cooperation. In: Grimaldo, F., Norling, E. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XV. MABS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9002. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14627-0_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14627-0_8

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-14626-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-14627-0

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