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Efficient Leakage Resilient Circuit Compilers

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Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015 (CT-RSA 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9048))

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Abstract

In this paper, we revisit the problem of constructing general leakage resilient compilers that can transform any (Boolean) circuit \(C\) into a protected circuit \(C'\) computing the same functionality as \(C\), which additionally is resilient to certain classes of leakage functions. An important problem that has been neglected in most works on leakage resilient circuits is to minimize the overhead induced by the compiler. In particular, in earlier works for a circuit \(C\) of size \(s\), the transformed circuit \(C'\) has size at least \(\mathcal {O}(sk^2)\), where \(k\) is the security parameter. In this work, using techniques from secure Multi-Party Computation, we show that in important leakage models such as bounded independent leakage and leakage from weak complexity classes the size of the transformed circuit can be reduced to \(\mathcal {O}(sk)\).

This is an extended abstract. Further details can be found in the full version.M. Andrychowicz and S. Dziembowski — Supported by the WELCOME/2010-4/2 grant founded within the framework of the EU Innovative Economy (National Cohesion Strategy) Operational Programme.S. Faust — Received funding from the Marie Curie IEF/FP7 project GAPS, grant number: 626467.I. Damgård and A. Polychroniadou — Research supported by the Danish National Research Foundation and the National Science Foundation of China (under the grant 61061130540) for the Sino-Danish Center for the Theory of Interactive Computation and from the Center for Research in Foundations of Electronic Markets (CFEM), supported by the Danish Strategic Research Council.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

    Ivan Damgård & Antigoni Polychroniadou

  2. EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Sebastian Faust

  3. Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland

    Marcin Andrychowicz & Stefan Dziembowski

Authors
  1. Marcin Andrychowicz
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  2. Ivan Damgård
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  3. Stefan Dziembowski
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  4. Sebastian Faust
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  5. Antigoni Polychroniadou
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Correspondence to Antigoni Polychroniadou .

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  1. Aalto University School of Science, Espoo, Finland

    Kaisa Nyberg

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Andrychowicz, M., Damgård, I., Dziembowski, S., Faust, S., Polychroniadou, A. (2015). Efficient Leakage Resilient Circuit Compilers. In: Nyberg, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_17

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