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Improved Attacks on Reduced-Round Camellia-128/192/256

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Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015 (CT-RSA 2015)

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Abstract

Camellia is a widely used block cipher, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we consider a new family of differentials of round-reduced Camellia-128 depending on different key subsets. There are totally 224 key subsets corresponding to 224 types of 8-round differentials, which cover a fraction of \(1-1/2^{15}\) of the keyspace. And each type of 8-round differential consists of \(2^{43}\) differentials. Combining with the multiple differential attack techniques, we give the key-dependent multiple differential attack on 10-round Camellia-128 with data complexity \(2^{91}\) and time complexity \(2^{113}\). Furthermore, we propose a 7-round property for Camellia-192 and an 8-round property for Camellia-256, and then mount the meet-in-the-middle attacks on 12-round Camellia-192 and 13-round Camellia-256, with complexity of \(2^{180}\) encryptions and \(2^{232.7}\) encryptions, respectively. All these attacks start from the first round in a single key setting.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, China

    Xiaoyang Dong, Leibo Li & Xiaoyun Wang

  2. Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Keting Jia

  3. Institute for Advanced Study, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

Authors
  1. Xiaoyang Dong
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  2. Leibo Li
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  3. Keting Jia
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  4. Xiaoyun Wang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Xiaoyun Wang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Aalto University School of Science, Espoo, Finland

    Kaisa Nyberg

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Dong, X., Li, L., Jia, K., Wang, X. (2015). Improved Attacks on Reduced-Round Camellia-128/192/256. In: Nyberg, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16715-2

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