Forming Coalitions in Self-interested Multi-agent Environments Through the Promotion of Fair and Cooperative Behaviour

Abstract

The issue of collaboration amongst agents in a multi-agent system (MAS) represents a challenging research problem. In this paper we focus on a form of cooperation known as coalition formation. The problem we consider is how to facilitate the formation of a coalition in a competitive marketplace, where self-interested agents must cooperate by forming a coalition in order to complete a task. Agents must reach a consensus on both the monetary amount to charge for completion of a task as well as the distribution of the required workload. The problem is further complicated because different subtasks have various degrees of difficulty and each agent is uncertain of the payment another agent requires for performing specific subtasks. These complexities, coupled with the self-interested nature of agents, can inhibit or even prevent the formation of coalitions in such a real-world setting. As a solution, a novel auction-based protocol called ACCORD is proposed here. ACCORD manages real-world complexities by promoting the adoption of cooperative behaviour amongst agents. Through extensive empirical analysis we analyse the ACCORD protocol and demonstrate that cooperative and fair behaviour is dominant and any agents deviating from this behaviour perform less well over time.