Abstract
A procedural choice problem occurs when there is no ex ante agreement on how to choose a decision rule nor an exogenous authority that is strong enough to single out a decision rule in a group. In this paper, we define the manner of procedural selection as a relation-valued procedural choice rule (PCR). Based on this definition, we then argue for some necessary conditions of a PCR. One of the main findings centers on the notion of consistency, which demands concordance between judged-better procedures and judged-better outcomes. Specifically, we found that the consistency principle and a modified version of the Pareto principle yield a simple impossibility result. We then show how the weakening of these conditions results to a degenerate PCR or the existence of a procedural veto. Finally, we show that the restriction of the preference domain to an extreme consequentialism can be seen as a positive result.
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Appendix (Proofs of the Propositions)
Appendix (Proofs of the Propositions)
Lemma 1.
Let K ≥ 1 be either finite or infinite. If a level-K PCR E satisfies the ‘if’ part of ILC, then for all \( x \in X, k \in \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,K} \right\} \) and f, g ∊ F k[x], we have fI(E k)g.
Proof.
We show the lemma inductively. Take arbitrary x ∊ X and \( f, g \in F^{1} \left[ x \right] \). Then, by reflexivity of E 0, we have xE 0 x, or f(R 0)E 0 g(R 0). Therefore, by the ‘if’ part of the ILC, we have fE 1 g. Since this argument is symmetric over f and g and does not depend on what x is, we have for all x and for all f, g ∊ F 1[x], fI(E 1)g.
Take any level k ∊ {1, …, K − 1}. Assume that for all f, g ∊ F k[x], fI(E k)g. Let u, v ∊ F k+1[x] be any x-supporting rules of level (k + 1). Then, by the completeness of E k+1, we have either uE k+1 v or vE k+1 u. Suppose one of these, for example uE k+1 v, does not hold. Then from the contraposition of ‘if’ part of the ILC, we have ¬(u(R k)E k v(R k)). By the completeness of E k, it is equivalent to v(R k)P(E k)u(R k). This contradicts the assumption, since u, v ∊ F k+1[x] implies \( u\left( {R^{k} } \right), v\left( {R^{k} } \right) \in F^{k} \left[ x \right] \) and therefore the assumption demands u(R k)I(R k)v(R k). Therefore, we have inductively shown that fI(E k)g holds for all \( x \in X, k \in \left\{ {1,2, \ldots ,K} \right\} \), and f, g ∊ F k[x]. â–
Proof of Proposition 1 [1]. 2 ≤ K < ∞: Take any x ∊ X. Consider a meta-profile R = (R 0, R 1, …, R K−1, R K) such that for all i ∊ N, \( F^{K} \left[ f \right]P\left( {O\left( {R_{i}^{K} } \right)} \right)F^{K} \left[ g \right] \) for some f, g ∊ F K−1[x]. By PWP on f and g, we have fP(E K−1)g. This contradicts Lemma 1, which demands that fI(E K−1)g. â–
[2] K = ∞: Take any x ∊ X and \( k \in \varvec{N} \). Take any \( R^{j} \in W\left( {F^{j} } \right)^{n} \left( {j = 0,1, \ldots ,k - 1} \right) \) and let f, g ∊ F k[x]. Consider a meta-profile such that for all i ∊ N and for all l ∊ {k + 1, k + 2, …}, \( uP\left( {R_{i}^{l} } \right)v \) for all \( u \in F^{l} \left[ f \right], v \in F^{l} \left[ g \right] \). Note that u, v ∊ F l[x]. At this point the PWP condition demands fP(E k)g while the Lemma 1 demands \( fI\left( {E^{k} } \right)g \). Contradiction. â–
Proof of Proposition 2 [1]. The ‘if’ part is trivial. We show the ‘only if’ part. Suppose PCR E satisfies ILC and AF. Take any meta-profile R ∊ D, level k ∊ {1, …, K} and procedures f, g ∊ F k. There are two possibilities concerning the similarity of \( f \) and g as a function. (1) There exists a level-k − 1 preference profile \( \tilde{R}{^{k - 1}} \in W\left( {F^{k - 1} }\right) \) such that \( f\left( \tilde{R}{^{k - 1}} \right) = g\left({\tilde{R}{^{k - 1}}} \right) \). Consider a meta-profile \( \tilde{R} = \left( {R^{0} ,R^{1} , \ldots ,\tilde{R}{^{k - 1}} ,R^{k} , \ldots ,R^{K} } \right) \). Then, by Lemma 1, we have \( fI\left( {\tilde{E}{^{k}}} \right)g \). On the other hand, we have \( E^{k} |_{{\left\{ {f,g} \right\}}} = \tilde{E}{^{k}}|_{{\left\{ {f,g} \right\}}} \). Therefore, we have fI(E k)g. (2) Otherwise, we consider SCF h over F k−1 such that h(R k−1) = f(R k−1) and h(R ′k−1) = g(R ′k−1) for all R ′k−1 ∊ W(F k−1) − {R k−1},. Since F k is the set of all possible SCFs over F k−1, such a SCF h is in F k. By applying (1) we have fI(E k)h and gI(E k)h. Thus, we have fI(E k)g.
Finally we must show that the PCR E is also indifferent for any alternatives x, y ∊ X. However, it is easy from the ‘only if’ part of the ILC and the above fact that fI(E 1)g for any f, g ∊ F 1. â–
Lemma 2.
(Arrow [ 16 ]). If a SWF \( f: W\left( A \right)^{n} \to W\left( A \right) \) satisfies WP and IIA, then there exists a dictator, where:
A dictator is an individual i ∊ N such that for all S ∊ W(A) and for all a, b ∊ A, aP(S i )b implies aP(f(S))b.
Proof of Proposition 2 [2]. Let E be a PCR that satisfies the ‘only if’ part of ILC, PWP, AF, and PIIA. Fix (R 0, R 1, …, R K−1) ∊ W(X) × W(F 1) × … × W(F K−1) and let A be a set such that \( {\text{A}}\text{ := }\left\{ {F^{K} \left[ f \right]|f \in F^{K - 1} } \right\} \). By AF, we have a function G such that for all R K, E K−1(R 0, …, R K) = G(R K). Moreover, by PIIA, there exists a function G ′:W(A)n → W(F K−1) such that \( G\left( {R^{K} } \right) = G^{'} \left( {O\left( {R_{1}^{K} } \right),O\left( {R_{2}^{K} } \right), \ldots ,O\left( {R_{n}^{K} } \right)} \right) \) for all R K ∊ W(F K). Let us consider another function \( \mu :W\left( {F^{K - 1} } \right) \to W\left( A \right) \) such that for all \( \tilde{R}{^{{{\text{K}} - 1}}} \in W\left({F^{K - 1} }\right) \) and f, g ∊ F K−1, \( f\tilde{R}{^{K - 1}} g \) if and only if \( F^{K} \left[f \right]\mu \left({\tilde{R}{^{K - 1}}} \right)F^{K} \left[g \right] \). Construct a composite function \( \nu \text{ := }\mu \bigcirc G^{'} :W\left( A \right)^{n} \to W\left( A \right) \). This is a SWF for the set A, and it is easy to see that our PWP and PIIA condition demands the WP and IIA for SWF ν. Therefore, by Lemma 2 we have a dictator j ∊ N (of SWF ν) such that for all S ∊ W(A) and for all F K[f], F K[g] ∊ A, if \( F^{K} \left[ f \right]P\left( {O\left( {R_{j}^{K} } \right)} \right)F^{K} \left[ g \right] \), then fP(ν(S))g. By the way we have constructed μ, we have fP(E K−1)g. Since this argument does not depend on the value of R 0, R 1, …, R K−1 or what f and g are, we can conclude that the set of axioms yield a vetoer over any pair in F K−1.
We must only show the level under K − 1. Take any level l ∊ {0, 1, …, K − 2} and any alternatives/procedures x, y ∊ F l. Assume that \( F^{K} \left[ x \right]P\left( {O\left( {R_{j}^{k} } \right)} \right)F^{K} \left[ y \right]\, \). Take f ′ ∊ F K−1[x] and g ∊ F K−1[y] such that \( F^{K} \left[ {f^{'} } \right] \in G\left( {O\left( {R_{j}^{K} } \right), B_{x} } \right) \) and \( F^{K} \left[ {g^{'} } \right] \in G\left( {O\left( {R_{j}^{K} } \right), B_{y} } \right) \), where B x : = {F K[h]|f ∊ F K−1[x]} and B y : = {F K[h]|f ∊ F K−1[y]}. Since \( O\left( {R_{j}^{K} } \right) \) is a weak ordering over \( 2^{{F^{K} }} \), \( G\left( {O\left( {R_{j}^{K} } \right),B_{w} } \right)\left( {w = x,y} \right) \) are non-empty and we can take such f′ and g′. Now, the definition of the operator O( ) and the assumption of F K[x]P(O(R))F K[y] together yield F K[f′]P(O(R))F K[g′]. From the above paragraph we get f′P(E K−1)g′. Finally, iterating the ‘only if’ part of ILC we get xE k y.â–
Proof of Proposition 3 [1]. The counterexample showed in the proof of Proposition 1 also applies under D C . â–
[2] Let us consider a SWF S:W(X)n → W(X) which satisfies the Pareto principle: for all preference profile of level 0 R 0 ∊ W(X), \( \left[ {xP\left( {R_{i}^{0} } \right)y\;for \;all\; i \in N} \right] \) implies xP(S(R 0))y. Now we define PCR E S such that (1) for all x, y ∊ X, xE 0 y if and only if xS(R 0)y and (2) for all k ∊ {1, 2, …, K} and f, g ∊ F k, fE k+1 g if and only if f(R k)E k g(R k). We will show that this E S is actually a PCR and satisfies the ILC and PWP. The completeness of each E k S (k = 0, 1, …, K) is obvious. To show they are transitive, suppose E k S ∊ W(F k). Take any procedures f, g, h ∊ F k+1 and assume fE k+1 g and gE k+1 h. By (2) we have f(R k)E k g(R k) and g(R k)E k h(R k). This implies f(R k)E k h(R k) by the transitivity of E k. By (2) once again we get fE k+1 h. Since E 0 ≡ S(R 0) is transitive, we have inductively that E k ∊ W(F k) for all k ∊ {0, 1, …, K}. Now we show that E S satisfies the ILC and PWP, but the former is obvious because of (2). So we show PWP. Take any k ∊ {0, 1, …, K − 1} and f, g ∊ F k. Suppose \( F^{l} \left[ f \right]P\left( {O\left( {R_{i}^{l} } \right)} \right)F^{l} \left[ g \right] \) for all l ∊ {k + 1, …, K}. Iterating the condition of extremely consequentialist, we have for all \( l \in \left\{ {{\text{k}} + 1, \ldots ,K} \right\} \). Iterating the condition of extremely consequentialist, we have for all \( i \in N \) \( f\left({R^{k - 1} } \right)P(R_{i}^{k - 1} )g(R^{k - 1} ),f\left({R^{k - 1}} \right)(R^{k - 2})P(R_{i}^{k - 2})g(R^{k - 1})(R^{k - 2}), \ldots,xP(R_{i}^{0})y, \) where \( f \in F^{k} [x] \) and \( {\text{g}} \in {\text{F}}^{\text{k}} \left[ {\text{y}} \right]. \) The Pareto prinicple of \( {\text{E}}^{ 0} \equiv {\text{S}}\left( {{\text{R}}^{0} } \right) \) implies \( {\text{xP}}\left( {{\text{E}}^{ 0} } \right){\text{y}} \). Iteration of the contraposition of the ‘only if’ part of the ILC gives \( fP(E^{k} )g \).
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Suzuki, T., Horita, M. (2015). How to Order the Alternatives, Rules, and the Rules to Choose Rules: When the Endogenous Procedural Choice Regresses. In: Kamiński, B., Kersten, G., Szapiro, T. (eds) Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation. GDN 2015. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 218. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19515-5_4
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